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Welfare to What?
NOAH ZATZ*
INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago, President Clinton fulfilled his campaign pledge to end
"welfare as we know it" by signing sweeping federal welfare reform
legislation.' The replacement of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF)2 marked an important transformation in the character of the
American welfare state. Work provided the core of the much-touted
public policy consensus underlying this transformation, one that
simultaneously restricted and expanded the availability of government
transfers to low-income Americans.' While tough new TANF work
requirements cut back on welfare for those who did not work, those who
did work but remained poor received new relief through massive
expansions of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)4 designed to "make
work pay."5 These two developments are not contradictory. Instead, they
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received invaluable research assistance from Michelle Alig, Sara Dooley, Lynn McClelland, Truc
Nguyen, Nicole Perez, and Halleh Rabizadeh, and from the Hugh & Hazel Darling Law Library,
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I. Remarks on Signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 and an Exchange With Reporters, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1325, 1327 (Aug. 22, I996) [hereinafter
PRWORA Signing Remarks] ("Today, we are ending welfare as we know it.").
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6OI-6I9 (2000).
3. See, e.g., PRWORA Signing Remarks, supra note I, at 1325-26; WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON,
WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 164 (1996); Ron Haskins, Liberal and
Conservative Influences on Welfare Reform Legislation of i996, in FOR BETTER AND FOR WORSE:
WELFARE REFORM AND THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 9, 17, 20 (Greg J. Duncan & P.
Lindsay Chase-Lansdale eds., 2001); Hugh Heclo, The Politics of Welfare Reform, in THE NEW WORLD
OF WELFARE 169, 196-97 (Rebecca M. Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001); Amy L. Wax, Something for
Nothing: Liberal Justice and Welfare Work Requirements, 52 EMORY L.J. I, 3 (2003). See generally
MAKING WORK PAY: AMERICA AFTER WELFARE (Robert Kuttner ed., 2002).
4. I.R.C. § 32 (2ooo).
5. The Food Stamps program has undergone a similar combination of restrictions and
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represent two sides of the single coin of work requirements: concurrent
work as a condition of transfer eligibility.'
This story is a familiar one, and accurate so far as it goes. What
leaves it incomplete is lack of specificity about the foundational category
of work. Indeed, precisely what to count as work recently became a
central point of controversy during Congress' struggle to reauthorize and
substantially rewrite the TANF statute. Ultimately, Congress made
almost no changes, but it did direct the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to issue regulations specifying, for the first time,
what activities can meet TANF's statutory definition of work."
To design and implement work-based transfer programs,
policymakers and administrators at various levels of government must
decide in some detail what counts as work. The content of that category
determines who feels the sting of new restrictions on welfare and who
receives the support of new transfers through the EITC. Moreover, the
degree of continuity between TANF's and the EITC's definitions of
work determines how these paired programs interact.
Surprisingly, despite this enormous weight placed on work, careful
examination of precisely what does and what should count as work is
virtually absent from the scholarly literature on work-based welfare
reform.9 Instead, work often is casually equated with the production of
expansions. See David A. Super, The Quiet "Welfare" Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp
Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1271, 273-74 (2004).
6. Although since the New Deal prior work has been a mainstay of eligibility for social insurance
programs like Social Security and Unemployment Insurance, means-tested "welfare" generally had
not required any work history and had conditioned eligibility on a present inability to work. See
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE
56-57, 61-62 (1999); Super, supra note 5, at 1290-91 (noting exceptional character of work-history
requirement for two-parent families in AFDC). Although a number of attempts to encourage and
sometimes require work from AFDC recipients had been made since the late i96os, until TANF they
were so riddled with exceptions and weak enforcement that they were largely symbolic in nature. See
JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, WE THE POOR PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY AND WELFARE 26-61(I997)-
7. The original five-year TANF program expired in September 2002 and was subject to repeated
short-term extensions for several years. See TANF Emergency Response and Recovery Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. io9-68, 119 Stat. 2003; Ron Haskins & Rebecca M. Blank, Welfare Reform: An Agenda for
Reauthorization, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE, supra note 3, at 3; Carl Hulse & Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Spending Bill in Hand, Congress Departs, N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 21, 2OO4, at 26.
8. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7101(c)(I), i2o Stat. 4, 136 (2006)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607(i)(I)(A) (2oo6)).
9. The major exception is Matthew Diller's early and thorough comparison of TANF's and
AFDC's work requirements and especially insightful analysis of their differing treatment of unpaid
"work experience." See generally Matthew Diller, Working Without a Job: The Social Messages of the
New Workfare, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. i9 (1998). This Article builds on Diller's work by addressing
state TANF law, TANF reauthorization, the EITC, and the emergence of new issues since the mid-
i99os, and by emphasizing the co-existence of conflicting rationales for work requirements. Amy Wax
has identified clearly and incisively the need for critics of welfare reform, particularly those who would
treat family caregiving as work, to offer a normatively and practically coherent theory of "work." See
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earned income or, even more narrowly, with full-time employment for
wages.
This Article begins to fill this gap by examining how the centerpieces
of federal welfare reform, TANF and the EITC, actually implement
work requirements and define "work." Because TANF devolved
substantial administrative and policymaking authority to the states," I
take this analysis beyond the level of federal law to the state-by-state
implementation of TANF's work requirements.
At a practical level, understanding the experiments already
Amy L. Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, 8 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 477, 484 (2ooi); Wax, supra note
3, at 30-33. But her own account of work requirements takes for granted the equation of work and
employment both as a normative matter and as a description of what current law requires. See Wax,
supra note 3, at 2-3 (characterizing welfare reform as mandating that recipients "engage in part-time
work and move toward full-time employment," and reflecting a consensus that "individuals are
expected to contribute to their own support through paid employment if they are able"). Similarly,
feminist critics who argue for inclusion of family caregiving as work typically take for granted that the
system they are criticizing requires exclusively paid employment without considering forms of work
other than unpaid caregiving and paid employment. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public
Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources, and Republicanism, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1673, 1676-77
(2001); Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom: Low-Income Mothers' Decisions
About Work at Home and in the Market, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1029, 1030, 1033 (2004)
(characterizing TANF as "mandat[ing] that recipients find paid employment"). For comprehensive
treatments of linking redistribution to paid work specifically, compare Anne L. Alstott, Work vs.
Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies, io8 YALE L.J. 967 (I999) (criticizing such
linkages), with Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, ioo COLUM. L. REV. I881 (200O) (supporting such linkages).
A number of other commentators have considered the merits of allowing welfare recipients to engage
in particular activities. See, e.g., Nan S. Ellis, Employer-Based Training Programs for TANF Recipients:
A Public Policy Examination, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 589 (2005); Rebekah J. Smith et al., The
Miseducation of Welfare Reform: Denying the Promise of Postsecondary Education, 55 ME. L. REV. 211
(2003). Outside of legal and policy scholarship, how to define work occasionally has received sustained
consideration. See Lourdes Beneria, Conceptualizing the Labour Force: the Underestimation of
Women's Economic Activities, in ON WORK: HISTORICAL, COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES
372 (R.E. Pahl ed., 1988); R.E. Pahl, Epilogue to ON WORK: HISTORICAL, COMPARATIVE AND
THEORETICAL APPROACHES, supra, at 744; Cato Wadel, The Hidden Work of Everyday Life, in SOCIAL
ANTHROPOLOGY OF WORK 365 (Sandra Wallman ed., 1979).
io. For instance, highly influential books such as Lawrence Mead's The New Politics of Poverty
and William Julius Wilson's When Work Disappears explore, from sharply different perspectives, the
causes and consequences of "non-work" in low-income America, and yet both treat anyone not
engaged in full-time, paid, formal employment reported to government data gatherers as not
"working." LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN AMERICA
48, 69 (992); WILSON, supra note 3, at I8-I9; see also EDMUND S. PHELPS, REWARDING WORK: How TO
RESTORE PARTICIPATION AND SELF-SUPPORT TO FREE ENTERPRISE 25, io8 (1997). For discussions of the
importance of unreported employment in the "informal" economy, especially in low-income
communities, see DANIEL DOHAN, THE PRICE OF POVERTY: MONEY, WORK, AND CULTURE IN THE
MEXICAN AMERICAN BARRIO 26-29 (2003); KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How
SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LoW-WAGE WORK 167-74 (0997); Alejandro Portes, The
Informal Economy and Its Paradoxes, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 426 (Neil J. Smelser
& Richard Swederg eds., 1994).
ii. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1146-47 (2000). TANF also authorizes
individual Native American nations or consortia to operate TANF programs independently from the
states. See 42 U.S.C. § 612 (2000).
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underway in the "laboratories of democracy"" can help inform the
upcoming clarification of federal work requirements policy. These state
practices are what the new federal regulations will either support or
suppress. More generally, they illustrate the tensions among, and
tensions within, competing approaches to work developed over the first
decade of experience with TANF. Any federal rules must grapple with
these same tensions. Finally, whatever their content, the new regulations
will prompt states to reconsider their existing approaches to work, and
the natural place to look for new ideas and cautionary tales is this body
of experience.
Immediate developments aside, analyzing existing legal definitions
of work also has much broader significance. It prepares the way for more
systematic examination of how work ought to be defined, depending on
how work requirements are justified in the first place. This Article
reveals the need to elaborate more precisely the implications of the
normative impulses behind work requirements and to make choices
between rationales for work requirements that can lead to conflicting
results.'3 Such choices are necessary because, as TANF itself reveals,
"work" can be defined in myriad, conflicting ways, depending on the
purposes work requirements serve. Thus, notwithstanding a consensus
endorsement of the abstraction "work," we can see in the states the
cracks that lie beneath that consensus. These cracks split open once we
move beyond high abstraction and into the mechanics of real-world
policy design.
Based on a review of the relevant statutes and regulations of all fifty
states and the District of Columbia, 4 this Article demonstrates a striking
level of variation in how state law permits TANF recipients to satisfy
their work requirements. TANF often is said to require welfare
recipients to get a job, but this statement is both literally false and
generally misleading, even though it does capture a real emphasis on
promoting employment.
State TANF law frequently, but not always, makes employment the
ultimate goal of work requirements. Paid jobs also are the leading means
by which individuals actually satisfy work requirements. Nonetheless,
TANF permits states to treat a wide range of activities as work. States
have seized on this discretion to develop welfare policies that take work
12. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.").
13. I discuss these rationales for work requirements at greater length in Noah D. Zatz, What
Welfare Requires From Work, 54 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 20o6).
14. Although my review was conducted as of August 2005, this Article cites the most recent 2oo6
version of certain materials where they have not been modified since my review.
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in strikingly different directions by permitting TANF recipients to meet
their work obligations through various unpaid activities. Sometimes
these activities-such as education, or participation in medical and social
services such as physical therapy or domestic violence counseling-are
cast as stepping stones to eventual employment. Such a link to
employment, however, is missing from other allowed activities, including
unpaid community service, care for family members with disabilities or
serious health conditions, and subsistence production to meet household
needs. Some states, however, interpret "work" much more narrowly and
disallow some or all of these unpaid activities.
The same range of possible approaches to work was also on display
throughout Congress' extended consideration of comprehensive
amendments during TANF reauthorization. The leading proposals all
endorsed a continued, indeed expanded, emphasis on work, and yet they
differed dramatically as to what federal TANF law should recognize as
work. As with state implementation to date, these debates provide
insight into the range of ways that the general idea of a work mandate
can be interpreted and thus suggest the directions that welfare work
policy might go in the future.
An initial point, then, is simply that within TANF there is a
considerable diversity of approaches to work. Not only is work
irreducible to paid employment, but also there are multiple approaches
to whether and under what circumstances unpaid activities are work.
These inconsistent definitions of work mirror the difficulty faced
when scholars of work, across many disciplines, attempt to define their
object of study.'5 Work's familiarity creates the temptation to see its
meaning as just common sense. Although paid employment generally is
taken as a starting point, more is at stake than simply a market
transaction. Is construction "work" when done for pay, but not when-as
in a barn-raising -done to fulfill a communal obligation of mutual
assistance, and not when-as in a Habitat for Humanity project-done
for charitable purposes without expectation of personal benefit?
6
To answer these questions, many criteria other than pay have been
offered up. They can be sorted roughly into three classes: (i) those
related to enabling consumption or use by the worker (a trait shared by
cash income, subsistence production, and non-market exchange
15. William Ronco & Lisa Peattie, Making Work: A Perspective from Social Science, in ON WORK:
HISTORICAL, COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES, supra note 9, at 709,715.
I6. Cf. Pahl, supra note 9, at 744. Indeed, tying work exclusively to the historically specific
institution of the labor markets in cash economies would mean that slaves, serfs, servants, apprentices,
and subsistence farmers do not work. Keith Thomas, Introduction to THE OXFORD BOOK OF WORK Xiii
(Keith Thomas ed., 1999); Chris Tilly & Charles Tilly, Capitalist Work and Labor Markets, in THE
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY, supra note so, at 283, 285.
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relationships);'7 (2) those related to the subjective experience or purpose
of work (traits such as exertion, use of skill, and being driven by necessity
or some purpose beyond the act itself);'8 and (3) those related to the
production of something valued by others (a trait shared by activities
that are paid, that are part of non-cash exchanges, or that could be part
of such exchanges)." 9 Each approach has its appeal but also its
limitations. Although many scholarly accounts have defined work with
reference to one, or some combination, of these characteristics, no robust
consensus has emerged. Indeed, "work" may best be understood as a
category without an entirely fixed meaning, one that not only varies
contextually but also remains malleable even within a given context."0
Against this backdrop, the variability in anti-poverty programs'
definitions of work looks both less puzzling and more structured. The
broad approaches to work just sketched resonate in the particular
activities included or excluded by the formal definitions in TANF. The
definitions reflect and draw out typical, but debatable, identifying
characteristics of work.
This definitional diversity has substantive implications. It captures
tensions among competing theories of what makes work distinctive and
important in a way that justifies imposing work requirements on welfare
receipt. The three main descriptive approaches to work sketched above
correspond roughly to three main normative rationales for work
requirements. First, arguments that work requirements promote self-
sufficiency emphasize how working can satisfy one's own consumption
needs without relying on transfers, thereby reducing economic burdens
on those otherwise taxed to fund transfers. Second, arguments that work
requirements promote self-improvement emphasize links between the
experience and practice of working and one's access to a virtuous or
fulfilling life. Third, arguments that work requirements institutionalize
reciprocity highlight the contribution work makes to the well-being of
17. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 9, 77, Ito (1959) (linking "labour" to
consumption); Benerfa, supra note 9, at 38o; Tilly & Tilly, supra note 16, at 286; D.A. Donahoe,
Measuring Women's Work in Developing Countries, 25 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 543,543-45 (1999).
I8. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING
6-7 (1983) ("The flight attendant does physical labor when she pushes heavy meal carts through the
aisles, and she does mental work when she prepares for and actually organizes emergency landings and
evacuations.... [S]he is also doing something more, something I define as emotional labor. This labor
requires one to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces
the proper state of mind in others .... "); Pahl, supra note 9, at 744; Thomas, supra note 16, at xiii-iv;
Wadel, supra note 9, at 370; Sandra Wallman, Introduction to SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF WORK, supra
note 9, at 1. 7.
i9. NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMIC AND FAMILY VALUES 66 (2001); HOCHSCHILD,
supra note 18, at 7; Tilly & Tilly, supra note 16, at 285; Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love:
Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. I, I 1 (1996).
20. Pahl, supra note 9, at 744, 747; Wadel, supra note 9, at 365.
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others or society at large."
With these competing rationales in mind, divergent TANF work
definitions make sense specifically as implementations of welfare work
requirements, not simply as ordinary usage of the word "work." This
point has important implications for how to evaluate state policy
variation. Rather than indicating deviations from a uniform underlying
national policy, or even accommodations of variable local conditions,
these divergent policies could reflect different resolutions of an
incoherent underlying national policy.
In addition to comparisons among TANF programs, we can also
compare TANF's approach to work with that contained in the EITC, to
which TANF has been closely linked. Once we do, another set of
tensions comes into view. Except in the most marginal of cases, the
EITC's approach to work is perfectly clear and can be described quickly:
the only eligible households are those with earnings from employment or
self-employment. Thus, when the EITC "makes work pay," the "work"
in question is never any of the unpaid activities that can count as "work"
for TANF purposes.
This disjuncture provides my second major point. The easy
symmetry between TANF and the EITC, reflecting their common
concern with work, breaks down once we examine work in more detail.
As a descriptive matter, TANF and the EITC, while clearly related in
important ways, cannot be understood simply as two different
administrative mechanisms for delivering poverty relief to "workers."
Instead, the character of work-based distribution shifts as we move from
TANF, which directs its cash benefits to the very poorest families, to the
EITC, which targets those who remain poor despite significant earnings.
The divergence between TANF's and the EITC's definitions of work
invite clarification of what differences between these programs, if any,
justify the variation.
At the heart of this shifting approach to work is a well-known
tension between rewarding work and alleviating poverty with a single
transfer program.22 What has received less attention is how this tension is
itself intertwined with definitions of work: supporting workers and
targeting the poorest come into conflict only after equating work with
earning. If work is broader than employment, however, then "work
supports" like the EITC discriminate among workers in their distribution
of anti-poverty benefits. This observation reflects a third general point:
21. Zatz,supra note 13.
22. See Rebecca M. Blank, The Employment Strategy: Public Policies to Increase Work and
Earnings, in CONFRONTING POVERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE I68, 168-69 (Sheldon H. Danziger et
al. eds., 1994); Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based
Welfare Reform, lo8 HARV. L. REV. 533, 551-54 (1995).
June 2006]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
definitions of work cannot be isolated from other aspects of transfer
design, including means-testing, benefit levels, and time limits.
In sum, the competing formal definitions of work in TANF and the
EITC provide a microcosm of the competing implications of different
approaches to work and why it matters. To be clear, this Article neither
seeks to explain as a historical matter why one or another approach to
work has been adopted in specific programs and jurisdictions,23 nor
assumes that policy actors actually are motivated by the normative
approaches to work that could justify their actions. 4 Instead, the
availability of such justifications helps make those actions possible and
defensible. Thus, this Article aims to show how legal actors range across
a terrain the features of which-clear paths here, formidable barriers
there-reflect broader aspects of the nature and role of work. Of course,
in so doing, they may leave their own mark, creating new possibilities for
how to think about work as we draw lessons from welfare work
requirements and apply them to the many other contexts in which work
matters.
I. WORK UNDER TANF
After vetoing previous bills, President Clinton signed the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
("PRWORA") in August 1996.25 In the eyes of its supporters and
detractors, the assessments of commentators, and the content of its
provisions, a thoroughgoing emphasis on promoting work was the
23. For exploration of this issue, see generally Joe Soss et al., Setting the Terms of Relief:
Explaining State Policy Choices in the Devolution Revolution, 45 AM. J. POL. Sc1. 378 (2oo); Thomas
Gais & R. Kent Weaver, State Policy Choices Under Welfare Reform, in WELFARE REFORM & BEYOND,
Apr. 2002 (Brookings Instit. Policy Brief No. 21), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
es/wrb/publications/pb/pb2 I.pdf.
24. For instance, a state's definition of work can affect the proportion of its caseload counted as
"working," which in turn has financial consequences for the state. See 42 U.S.C. § 6o9(a)(3) (2ooo)
(mandating a reduction in federal aid where a state fails to comply with minimum participation rates).
Thus, a state might change its definition of work in order to avoid federal penalties, rather than alter
what its welfare recipients do. On the connection between work definitions and formal accountability
mechanisms, see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HHS SHOULD EXERCISE OVERSIGHT TO HELP
ENSURE TANF WORK PARTICIPATION IS MEASURED CONSISTENTLY ACROSS STATES, GAO-o5-82I (2005),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do582i.pdf [hereinafter HHS SHOULD EXERCISE OVERSIGHT];
Thomas Kaplan, "Whatever We Have Been Doing": Policy Control over TANF, 22 Focus 35 (2002),
available at http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/focus/pdfs/foc22i-part2.pdf. Because supervisory
authorities and the public at large may be unaware of the sensitivity of such statistics to definitional
variation, such a substanceless definitional shift could also affect a state program's political standing.
On welfare bureaucracies' responsiveness to their political environment and to quantified
performance measures, see generally Jonathan Zasloff, Children, Families, and Bureaucrats: A
Prehistory of Welfare Reform, 14 J.L. & POL. 225 (1998).
25. See GERTRUDE SCHAFFNER GOLDBERG & SHEILA D. COLLINS, WASHINGTON'S NEW POOR LAW:
WELFARE REFORM AND THE ROADS NOT TAKEN- 1935 TO THE PRESENT 18S, 194-97 (2001); MICHAEL B.
KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 326-30 (Toth
anniv. ed. 1996); Heclo, supra note 3, at 189-94.
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centerpiece of the resulting TANF program, 6 which replaced the New
Deal-era AFDC program but maintained AFDC's traditional mission of
"provid[ing] assistance to needy families." 7
Members of Congress and the President offered an array of
arguments for this new role for work: rejecting "dependency on public
benefits '""S in favor of "[the] principle that defines the market
economy... namely, that income must be earned";29 promoting "the
dignity, the power and the ethic of work";3" and requiring that those
receiving welfare "[be] required to return [something] to society."3' Work
requirements were clearly designed to end individual welfare receipt by
"making [former recipients] independent, productive taxpayers,"3 but
work also was something to be done not just after but while receiving
TANF benefits: "Today there is a new attitude in Congress about
work.... [A]lmost all able-bodied adults on welfare should work."33
The many tasks set for work are reflected in how TANF defines the
term, both in the federal statute and in the more specific state authorities
that implement it. Consistent with a self-sufficiency approach, the
remunerative aspect of paid employment is of central importance. Self-
sufficiency not only makes employment itself a priority but also provides
a rationale for unpaid activities that might one day lead to employment.
Nonetheless, other considerations play a role both in deciding whether
an activity is work at all and in assigning priority among work activities.
Particularly prominent is an emphasis on an activity's wider social
meaning or value, a theme that resonates with reciprocity and manifests
26. See H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 3 (1996); Haskins, supra note 3, at 9, i6. In addition, TANF
eliminated AFDC's federal entitlement to assistance for all those meeting eligibility requirements and
substituted an annual block grant for the previous financing mechanism of federal matching funds
linked to the amount of state benefit payments. See 42 U.S.C. §§6oi(b), 6o3(a)(I) (2000). See
generally HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 6, at 206-0.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 6oi(a)(i) (2000).
28. H.R. REP. No. 104-8I(I), at 18 (I995); accord H.R. REP. No. io4-651, at 826 (stating "overall
goal of moving welfare recipients from dependency to employment and self-sufficiency").
29. H.R. REP. No. 104-81(1), at '9.
30. PRWORA Signing Remarks, supra note i, at 1325; accord 142 CONo. REC. H9392-oi, 9405
(daily ed. July 31, 1996) (statement of Rep. Camp) ("This proposal requires each recipient to work for
their benefits, thereby instilling the pride of employment and allowing each recipient to earn a
paycheck. This sense of accomplishment and independence increases the individual's self-esteem and
often influences the children who can see firsthand the benefits of a strong work ethic."); 142 CONG.
REC. H7745-o4, 7749 (1996) (statement of Rep. Kingston) (self-esteem); 142 CONG. REC. S8493-O2,
8495 (1996) (statement of Sen. D'Amato) (pride).
31. H.R. REP. No. 104-8I(I), at 18; accord H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 822 ("making work a
requirement in exchange for cash welfare assistance"); id. at 2027 (endorsing "reciprocal obligations"
between welfare recipients and the public).
32. H.R. REP. No. 104-75, at i6 (1995).
33. H.R. REP. No. 104-8i(1), at page 18; accord JASON TURNER, ENGAGEMENT OF TANF
RECIPIENTS: THE LESSONS OF NEW YORK CITY (2003), http://www.heritage.org/Research/
Welfare/bgi651.cfm.
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formally in the category of "community service."
A. THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE OF TANF WORK REQUIREMENTS
The principal federal mechanism for enforcing TANF work
requirements is through "participation rate" requirements applied to
each state. These requirements specify a percentage of the total TANF
caseload that must be "engaged in work."' If these benchmarks are not
met, the state loses a significant amount of federal funding for its TANF
program.35 To count toward meeting the required participation rate,
currently 50%,36 an adult TANF recipient must be engaged in one or
more specified "work activities" for at least a certain number of hours
per week.37 The required amount of work ranges from twenty to thirty-
five hours per week, depending on the household structure and the age
of the youngest child in the household . These participation rate
requirements apply directly only to states, not to individual TANF
recipients. Other aspects of TANF encourage states to meet their
participation rates by requiring adult TANF recipients to work as a
condition of benefit eligibility.39 Exactly how states have done is
described in Part I.B.
The list of federally authorized work activities has two tiers. At least
twenty hours of work must come from a core set of activities consisting
of:
(i) unsubsidized employment;
(2) subsidized private sector employment;
(3) subsidized public sector employment;
(4) work experience;
(5) on-the-job training;
(6) job search and job readiness assistance;
34. 42 U.S.C. § 6o 7 (b)(i)(A), (b)(2)(A), (c) (2ooo).
35. Id. § 6o9(a)(3).
36. The required rate was 25% in 1997, TANF's first year, then rose steadily to 50% in 2o02. Id.
§ 6o7(a)(i). These rates apply to the caseload as a whole, but TANF also includes a separate, higher
participation rate for two-parent households. Id. § 6o7(a)(2).
37. Id. § 6o7(c)(i)(A); see also Diller, supra note 9, at 20-27 (comparing work requirements in
TANF and its predecessor AFDC).
38. Id. § 6o7(c)(t)(A)-(B), (2)(B); see also infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 6o7(e) (requiring that states impose "[p]enalties against individuals" who
"refuse[] to engage in work required in accordance with [participation rate requirements]"); id.
§ 6o2(a)(i)(A)(ii) (mandating that states require individuals to "work," without further definition,
within two years of beginning to receive TANF assistance, but without specifying penalties for
noncompliance); id. § 6o8(b)(2)(A)(i) (authorizing states to create and enforce "individual
responsibility plans... for moving the individual immediately into private sector employment").
Another important work-related feature of TANF is its five-year cumulative time limit on any adult's
receipt of federal assistance. Id. § 6o8(a)(7). The time limit was intended to provide the ultimate work
requirement, ensuring that after five years there would be no choice but to find another source of
income. See Haskins, supra note 3, at 9, 17.
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(7) community service programs;
(8) vocational educational training; and
(9) providing child care services to someone participating in
community service.40
Any remaining hours may come either from this core or from an
additional set of activities consisting of:
(i) job skills training directly related to employment;
(2) education directly related to employment for non-high school
graduates; and
(3) high school or GED coursework for non-high school graduates.'
"Work" is thus a heterogeneous category under TANF, even at the
federal level. Work does not mean simply an ordinary job in which an
employer pays an employee for services rendered. Instead, it also
includes subsidized employment, in which an employee receives a
paycheck from the employer but the costs are borne all or in part by the
welfare agency.42 Further afield, welfare recipients in so-called "work
experience" or "workfare" provide services like those provided by
ordinary employees (filing papers, sweeping streets, picking up trash in
parks or office buildings), but instead of a paycheck the welfare recipient
simply continues to receive welfare benefits. 43 "Community service"
likewise implies provision without pay of services of value to a
"community," though not necessarily ones mirroring the tasks of paid
jobs.' Finally, TANF recognizes work activities that neither provide any
immediate benefit to others nor produce income for the recipients, but
which do relate to future employment: job search and employment-
related education or training.
Broad as these categories are, there are important limitations.
TANF largely excludes from "work" educational activities lacking some
40. 42 U.S.C. § 6o7(c)(i), (d). Vocational education is subject to two limitations: it may count as a
work activity only for twelve months for any one individual, and for no more than 30% of those the
state counts toward its participation rate. Id. § 6o7(c)(2)(D), (d)(8). Job search may not count as a
work activity for any individual for more than four consecutive weeks, or more than six weeks in total
(or twelve in high unemployment areas). Id. § 6o7(c)(2)(A).
41. Id. § 6o7(c)(1), (d). For teenage parents under age twenty, work requirements may be entirely
satisfied by attending high school or participating in employment-related education for at least twenty
hours per week. Id. § 607(c)(2)(C).
42. Id. § 607(d)(2), (3); MAURICE EMSELLEM & STEVE SAVNER, THE FISCAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
FOR CREATING A COMMUNITY SERVICE EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM 7 0997), available at
http://nelp.org/docUploads/pub29%2Epdf.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 6o7(d)(4) (2o00). See generally United States v. City of New York, 359 F.3 d 83
(2d Cir. 2004); Jason A. Turner & Thomas Main, Work Experience Under Welfare Reform, in THE
NEW WORLD OF WELFARE, supra note 3, at 291; Diller, supra note 9; EMSELLEM & SAVNER, supra note
42.
44. See STEVE SAVNER, GLOSSARY OF WORK PROGRAM TERMS 3 (1997), available at http://
www.clasp.org/publications/GlossaryofWork-ProgramTermsrevised_i 1-97.pdf.
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link to employment,45 most significantly all forms of non-vocational post-
secondary education. 6 Also absent from the explicitly recognized forms
of work are activities that directly benefit only other members of one's
own household, such as unpaid housekeeping or care for the young or
disabled.47 Supporting such care is one of TANF's explicit purposes -"to
provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in
their own homes"' Nonetheless, TANF recognizes such care only as a
basis for an excuse from or a reduction in work requirements, not as a
way to meet them. For single parents of children under six years old, ten
fewer weekly hours of work are required relative to parents of older
children,49 and work requirements may be waived entirely for single
parents of infants.50 In contrast, taking care of other people's children,
with or without pay, explicitly is included in the list above.5
Although TANF provides very loose definitions of work in some
respects, in others it emphasizes employment specifically. Not only is
some connection to current or future employment required for most of
the specified work activities, but TANF also provides for "individual
responsibility plan[s] ... for moving the individual immediately into
private sector employment."52  More generally, TANF has been
implemented in ways that consistently prioritize employment. At both
the federal and state levels, the relevant agencies place great emphasis on
a pervasive, albeit informal, message that welfare recipients should be
seeking a paycheck in order to avoid a welfare check. 3 This more
symbolic aspect can be seen, for instance, in renaming "Income
Maintenance Centers" as "Job Centers"' and in hanging banners in
45. The sole exception is high school education for individuals lacking a high school degree or a
General Education Diploma (GED).
46. See generally Pamela Friedman, TANF Reauthorization and Postsecondary Education Options
for Welfare Recipients, REAUTHORIZATION NOTES, Sept. 2oo, http://www.financeproject.org/
Publications/tanfreauth-postsecedureauthorization.htm; Cr. FOR LAW & Soc. POLICY, FORTY STATES
LIKELY TO CUT ACCESS TO POSTSECONDARY TRAINING AND EDUCATION UNDER HOUSE WELFARE BILL,
(2002), http://www.clasp.org/publications/docPostsecsurvey-o6i9o2.pdf.
47. A few jurisdictions have classified caregiving for foster children or household members with
disabilities as "community service." See discussion infra Part I.B.i.b.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 6oi(a)(i) (2000).
49. Id. § 607 (c)(2)(B).
50. Id. § 6o7(b)(5). In addition, for married couples receiving TANF, one parent need not work at
all so long as child-care is not being provided by someone else. See id. § 6o7(c)(I)(B) (specifying two-
parent cumulative weekly work requirement of thirty-five hours, so long as the couple is not receiving
federal child-care assistance and neither adult is caring for a family member with a disability).
51. Id. § 607(d)(12).
52. Id. § 6o2(a)(I)(A)(ii).
53. See Thomas L. Gais et al., Implementation of the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, in THE
NEW WORLD OF WELFARE, supra note 3, at 35, 38-48 (describing how changes in bureaucratic process
and agency culture send the message "get a job quickly").
54. See Jason DeParle, What Welfare-to-Work Really Means, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 20, 1988, at
59; LYNNE FENDER ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, STATE UPDATE No. 12, RECENT CHANGES IN NEW
YORK WELFARE AND WORK, CHILD CARE, AND CHILD WELFARE SYSTEMS I, 9 (2002), available at
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welfare offices with messages like "Welcome Job Seekers!" and "You
Have A Choice, Choose a Job-Work First."55 In this less technical
sense, the ubiquitous references to work-in state programs named
"CalWorks" 56 and "Wisconsin Works,"57 in federal "Welfare-to-Work"
grants,"s and elsewhere -clearly invoke unsubsidized employment.59
In sum, "work" cannot be encapsulated in a single definition or
concept under TANF. One can be "engaged in work" without getting
paid, and even without being prepared to get paid, and yet there is also
an undeniable emphasis on paid employment.
B. STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF TANF WORK REQUIREMENTS
TANF confers on the states considerable flexibility in how work
requirements are implemented. Most simply, nothing in TANF dictates
how states choose from among the list of authorized activities. A state
with 50% work participation in vocational education and community
service 6° is equally compliant as one that has 50% participation in
unsubsidized employment.6'
Not only does federal law recognize a range of permissible work
activities, but, until recently, it entrusted the states with interpretation of
these categories rather than providing further regulatory definition.62
Congress has now directed HHS to issue such regulations,' but it is too
early to know whether these new regulations will be more restrictive
than current state practice, will encourage more expansive
interpretations of the statute, or will focus on technical clarifications.
Regardless, what states have done during TANF's first decade remains
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/31o564-SUi2.pdf.
55. See Gais et al., supra note 53, at 46.
56. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., State TANF Program Names, at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/tnfnames.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
57. Id.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 6o3(a)(5).
59. Id. § 603(a)(5)(C)(i) (defining allowable activities funded by Welfare-to-Work grants as those
that "move individuals into and keep individuals in lasting unsubsidized employment").
60. Subject to the limitation that no more than 30% of the caseload may receive credit for
vocational education. Id. § 6o7(c)(2)(D).
61. In this respect, the "work first" priority on immediate placement into unsubsidized
employment is more prominent in the rhetoric accompanying PRWORA than it is in the statute's
actual content. The House committee report accompanying the PRWORA, for instance, declares that
the legislation rejects "education and training first-maybe work later," mandates "work first," and
permits education or training only "in conjunction with work [referring to employment or workfare],"
but this simply is not what the statute says. H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 825 (1996). The report goes on to
note the "committee's belief," not written into the statute, that unsubsidized employment should be
prioritized over subsidized employment, which should in turn be prioritized over work experience. Id.
at 826.
62. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Final Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 17719, 1776
(1999); see also 45 C.F.R. § 26o.31 (1999).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 6o7(i).
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important because it provides a template from which future legislative
reform efforts will draw, because it reveals the varying ways that states
thought TANF's work policies could and should be carried out, and
because states will continue to have significant authority to craft welfare
work activities that may or may not satisfy federal requirements.
States' latitude in requiring work, and how they define it, goes
beyond simply the flexibility afforded by the list of federally authorized
work activities. First, because TANF requires a nominal participation
rate of 50%, and often a much lower effective rate,64 not all of a state's
welfare recipients must be "working" under federal law. For the
remainder of the caseload, even if a state cannot count individuals'
activities toward its federal participation rate, it may require that they
meet a broader state definition. 5
A second major source of flexibility is that the participation rate
calculation only applies to adult recipients of federally-funded TANF
benefits. This creates mechanisms by which states can provide welfare
benefits with either state-specific work requirements, or with no
requirements at all. They can exclude adults from the welfare "case" and
66
nominally pay benefits only for the household's children. States can alsopay benefits with their own funds, rather than federal TANF dollars,6 7
64. Because states receive a "caseload reduction credit" toward their participation rate based on
reductions in the size of the caseload, many states could, if they so chose, comply with TANF by
requiring only a very small proportion of their caseload, sometimes none at all, to work. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 6o7(b)(3); 45 C.F.R. § 261.4o-44. In effect, this means that a state can meet its participation rate
either by having a current recipient work or by having recipients (on net) leave welfare entirely, on the
theory that these "leavers" have left due to work. As a result of the caseload reduction credit, most
states' effective participation rate requirements, measured as a percentage of current caseloads, are
below Io% and many are zero. See Memorandum from U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services,
Office of Family Assistance to State Agencies Administering the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families Program tbl.iA (Jan. 13, 2oo6), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/
particip/indexparticip.htm [hereinafter 2004 Participation Rates].
65. In some such cases, TANF mandates that states require "work" but gives them total
discretion in how to define it. 42 U.S.C. § 6o2(a)(i)(A)(ii).
66. This is known as a "child-only" case, in which only the children in a household are deemed to
be recipients of TANF benefits, while their adult caretakers (usually relatives but not parents) are not.
These households may receive TANF benefits without being subject to federal work requirements. See
id. §§ 6o7(b)(i)(B)(i), 6o8(7)(B). Approximately one-third of TANF cases are child-only. See U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TANF TIME LIMITS AND WORK REQUIREMENTS, GAO-02- 7 7 0, 8-1O (2002)
[hereinafter TANF TIME LIMITS]; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE TO
NEEDY FAMILIES, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1-7 (2004), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/annualreport6/ar6index.htm [hereinafter SIXTH ANNUAL TANF
REPORT].
67. This is known as a "separate state program," in which a state separately authorizes and funds
a welfare program that operates in parallel with its TANF-funded program. See 45 C.F.R. § 260.30;
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HELPING FAMILIES ACHIEVE SELF-SUFFICIENCY: A GUIDE ON
FUNDING SERVICES FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES THROUGH THE TANF PROGRAM (i999), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/funds2.htm; TANF TIME LIMITS, supra note 66, at 6-8; SIXTH
ANNUAL TANF REPORT, supra note 66, at 1-2-6; MARK H. GREENBERG, CLASP, BEYOND WELFARE:
NEW OPPORTUNITIES To USE TANF To HELP Low-INCOME WORKING FAMILIES 8-9 (1999),
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though this will soon become more difficult. 6 Either way, adults who do
not meet the federal definition of "working" do not depress participation
rates because they are excluded from the denominator in the calculation.
Finally, for the entire caseload, states are free to mandate more
work, or to define work more narrowly, than federal law requires. Many
have done so.69 Thus, for most of its caseload, a state typically can choose
policies ranging from no work requirements at all, to the opposite
extreme of cutting off any recipient who fails to perform a single activity
(such as unsubsidized employment or work experience) for forty hours
per week. Within the framework of TANF, the states thus have had the
discretion to implement widely varying work requirement policies,
including policies that reflect very different understandings of what
conduct should satisfy work requirements.
This flexibility renders fundamentally incomplete any
characterization of TANF that focuses on federal law alone. To assess
where state TANF programs actually fall within this vast range of
possibility, I identified and reviewed the statutes and regulations"
http://www.clasp.org/publications/beyond-welfare-new-opportunities.pdf. An additional variant is
"segregated funding." In a program operated with segregated funds, individuals are included in
participation rate calculations and are subject to work requirements but not federal time limits. This
allows states to "stop the clock" for individuals who are complying with federal work requirements but
still count them toward participation rates. See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 67 at 8-9; JULIE STRAWN &
KARIN MARTINSON, MDRC, STEADY WORK AND BETrER Joas: HOW TO HELP LOW-INCOME PARENTS
SUSTAIN EMPLOYMENT AND ADVANCE IN THE WORKFORCE 26-28 (2000) (describing an Illinois program
using segregated funds for welfare recipients who are employed full-time). State expenditures for
separate state and segregated fund programs count towards the state's obligation to match federal
TANF grants with what are called state "maintenance of effort" (MOE) funds. This MOE
requirement prevents states from funding their welfare programs exclusively out of the federal
treasury. See 42 U.S.C. § 6o9(a)(7); 45 C.F.R. § 263.1-9.
68. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 requires HHS to issue regulations governing the inclusion
of "child-only" cases in work participation rate calculations, though it does not enunciate a policy that
these regulations should implement. See 42 U.S.C. § 6o7(i). The Act also requires that participants in
separate state programs be included in work participation rate calculations if states count their
expenditures on such programs toward meeting their MOE requirement. See Deficit Reduction Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7102, i2o Stat. 4, 136 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6o7(a)(I), (a)(2),
(b)(i)(B)(i), (c)(2)(A)(i), (e)(I), (e)(2)). It is too early to know whether states will respond by
eliminating these programs or by simply continuing to run them and counting other expenditures
toward their MOE requirements.
69. See infra note 76 and Part I.B.i.a.
7o. A number of states do not issue separate regulations for their TANF programs but instead
have general regulations incorporating by reference the state's official manual for welfare
caseworkers. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, div. 2, pt. 1; CONN. AGENCIES REGS. 17B-IO-I; W. VA. CODE
§ 78-4-2. I treat these manuals like other regulatory authority. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF SOCIAL
SERVICES, ELIGIBILITY AND ASSISTANCE STANDARDS MANUAL (2004), available at
http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/ord/CDSSManual 24o.htm [hereinafter CAL. MANUAL); CONNECTICUT
DEP'T OF LABOR, JOBS FIRST EMPLOYMENT SERVICES PROGRAM PROCEDURES MANUAL (2004), available at
http://www.ctdol.state.ct.us/weltowrk/completeversion.pdf; BUREAU FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, WEST
VIRGINIA DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN RESOURCES, INCOME MAINTENANCE MANUAL,
http://www.wvdhhr.orgfbcf/policy/imm/new-manual/default.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2006)
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implementing work requirements in the TANF programs of all fifty
states and the District of Columbia7' as they existed in August 2005.72
This approach has important limitations because most states further
devolve substantial discretion to local authorities, individual
caseworkers, or both,73 and because formal policies capture only part of
what guides program implementation on the ground.7 The authorities I
studied do, however, provide a fairly comprehensive look at the formal
legal constraints under which local programs operate and at the
considered policies adopted by state-level decisionmakers.75
Most importantly for my purposes here, these state laws illustrate
the wide range of ways in which policymakers can implement the broad
mandate for work reflected in TANF. While many have focused on
promoting "self-sufficiency" through employment, they have done so in
widely varying ways. Some emphasize immediate employment, while
others focus on preparation for future employment through activities as
varied as on-the-job training, college education, and drug rehabilitation.
Often, improved employment prospects appear to be only one of many
goals such activities serve. And in some cases, employment drops from
the picture entirely, and the focus instead shifts to meeting some family
or community need or to leaving welfare through some mechanism other
than increased earnings.
[hereinafter W. VA. MANUAL]. Alabama and Indiana lack significant statutory and regulatory
authority directly on point and grant broad discretion to an administrative body to implement TANF.
See ALA. CODE § 3 8-4-I(d) (2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-14-28-3, -7 (2oo6). For Indiana, I reviewed its
official welfare agency policy manual. See INDIANA FAMILY & SOCIAL SERVICES ADMIN., PROGRAM POLICY
MANUAL FOR CASH ASSISTANCE, FOOD STAMPS AND HEALTH COVERAGE, available at
http://www.in.gov/fssa/families/manual.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006). For Alabama, I relied on what
little could be gleaned from its regulations. See ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 660-2-20-.02 (2005). All states are
required to submit a TANF plan to HHS. 42 U.S.C. § 602. Some states make these plans available
online, and in some cases I have supplemented my analysis with materials from such plans.
71. The legal authorities governing tribal TANF programs are not readily available, but HHS
provides a summary at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/dts/ttanchar_1002.htm (last visited Apr. 14,
2006).
72. Because of the magnitude of the task, I did not attempt to record all important aspects of the
state programs but instead focused on what activities may satisfy TANF work requirements and what
circumstances justify exemption from those requirements. A more comprehensive review of state
welfare policies has been undertaken by the Urban Institute's Assessing the New Federalism Project,
and the results of that survey are available at http://anfdata.urban.org/WRD/WRDWelcome.cfm (last
visited Apr. 14, 20G6). The Urban Institute's database, however, is based in part on caseworker
manuals and state survey responses that do not have the force of law, and it reports only the results of
its own categorization of state policies without providing citation to its underlying sources or the
details of state policies.
73. See Diller, supra note I I, at 1147-48.
74. See JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND WORKFARE IN THE UNITED STATES AND
WESTERN EUROPE 81-82 (2004); Diller, supra note I I, at 1130-34; Zasloff, supra note 24, at 239-50.
75. To my knowledge there are no significant local approaches to work requirements that lack
either specific state authorization or state-level analogues elsewhere.
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i. State Definitions of Work Activities
What, in fact, have the states done? In practice, states universally
have created individual work requirements applicable to nearly all adult
recipients. These work requirements are organized principally around
the federally authorized work activities, and they usually have grace
periods and hours expectations more stringent than the federal
requirements. 76 Rather than attempting to minimize the scope of work
requirements by, for instance, attempting to meet but not exceed federal
participation rates,77 states typically require most TANF recipients to
work.
For individual welfare recipients, these state work policies are more
significant than federal TANF requirements. Moreover, individual
caseworkers or informal local policies ultimately determine precisely
what work will be done. They do so by controlling the content of an
"individual responsibility plan" or similar device that imposes on the
recipient a specific work assignment (attending a specific training
program, or performing community service at a particular time and
place) and sometimes other behavioral requirements.7' Thus, recipients
must perform a work activity chosen for them from among the legally
authorized work activities; they are not free to comply with work
requirements simply by making their own choice from that list.79
76. Almost all states require non-exempt welfare recipients to begin work immediately, rather
than taking advantage of the twenty-four month grace period permitted by TANF; a large majority of
states require thirty or more weekly hours of work from all those subject to work requirements,
notwithstanding TANF's allowance of twenty hours per week for parents of children under six years
old, and a substantial minority require more than thirty hours per week. See GRETCHEN RowE &
JEFFREY VERSTEEG, WELFARE RULES DATABOOK: STATE TANF POLICIES AS OF JULY 2003 96-97 (2005).
Additionally, a majority of states do not take full advantage of TANF's option to exclude from work
requirements single parents of children under one year old, often providing no exemption at all or one
that lasts only three months. See id. at 168-69.
77. Averaged nationally, participation rates exceed those required by federal law by 28% of the
total caseload as of 2004. This calculation uses the stricter figure that excludes state-specific waivers of
some TANF requirements. See 2004 Participation Rates, supra note 64, at tbl.iA. All but six
jurisdictions (Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Indiana, Mississippi, Nevada, and Utah) exceeded
their participation rates by over 5%. Id. In raw terms, about 245,000 more welfare recipients are
working than necessary to comply with TANF participation rates. This calculation is based on
multiplying each state's excess participation rate by its caseload. Id. at tbls.iA, 3A.
78. According to a survey conducted by the National Governors Association, the vast majority of
TANF recipients in the vast majority of states have such a plan in place. See NAT'L GOVERNORS Ass'N,
WELFARE REFORM REAUTHORIZATION: STATE IMPACT OF PROPOSED CHANGES IN WORK REQUIREMENTS
APRIL 2002 SURVEY RESULTS (2002), http://www.nga.org/cda/files/welfaresurveyo4o2.pdf; see also
HANDLER, supra note 74, at 248-60 (2004) (discussing the relationship between caseworker and
recipient in the formation of such plans or "contracts").
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 6o8(b)(2), (3) (permitting states to develop individual responsibility plans "in
consultation with the individual," but not necessarily with the individual's consent, and to penalize
noncompliance with such plans); Kosmicki v. State, 652 N.W.2d 883 (Neb. 2002) (upholding sanction
for noncompliance with a "self-sufficiency contract"); Bishop v. N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Servs., 667
N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that choice among allowable work activities is
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The state and local flexibility provided by TANF has been used both
to make work requirements more stringent, and to make them less so. In
the former case, states have both increased the amount of work required
and narrowed what work may be done. In the latter, states generally
have broadened what counts as work rather than declining to require
work at all.8"
a. Narrow State Approaches to Work
States have narrowed the scope of work in four main ways. First,
Table I shows that many have eliminated federally allowable activities
from state definitions of work. The majority of states8' do not include
"discretionary" with the welfare agency); Oritz v. Hammons, 654 N.Y.S.2d 993 (Sup. Ct. 1997)
(upholding refusal of welfare agency to permit high school attendance in lieu of work experience
assignment); Dozier v. Williams Cty. Soc. Serv. Bd., 603 N.W.2d 493 (N.D. 1999) (upholding sanction
for non-compliance with work assignment because welfare agency controlled choice among allowable
activities and signing of welfare "contract" was not a prerequisite for imposing work-related
sanctions); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REDS. tit. 12, § 1300.9(b)(9) (2oo6) (granting to the local welfare
agency "the right to determine, consistent with statute and regulations, the activity or activities to
which an applicant or recipient is to be assigned"). Some states specifically entitle recipients to
continue "self-initiated" activities, usually education or training. See, e.g., CAL. MANUAL § 42-711.54 at
25 (2005); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1240-1-49.03(3) (2oo6). Alaska does the opposite, specifically
requiring recipients "to drop or modify a personal activity, such as vocational training or post-
secondary education, if the department determines that pursuit of the activity interferes with the
individual's participation in an activity assigned ... " ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 45.260(c) (2oo6).
80. Notwithstanding official policies of universal work, in most states the majority of adult
recipients of TANF assistance are not participating in any work activity. This remains true even when
using broad measures that count those participating for any amount of time (not necessarily enough
hours to count toward the TANF participation rate) and in activities that meet state, but not
necessarily federal TANF, definitions of work, although these broader measures do show much higher
rates of work than suggested by federal participation rates alone. See TANF TIME LIMITS, supra note
66, at 29-30; SHARON PARROTT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, ARE STATES REQUIRING TANF
RECIPIENTS To PARTICIPATE IN WELFARE-To-WORK ACTIVITIES? FREQUENTLY CITED STATISTIC Is
INCOMPLETE AND MISLEADING I (2OO2), http://www.cbpp.org/4-25-o2tanf.pdf; 2004 Participation Rates,
supra note 64, at tbls.IA, 6C. As discussed infra Part I.D, these figures also underestimate levels of
work by excluding households receiving "non-assistance" TANF-funded benefits.
81. ALASKA STAT. § 47.27.900(10) (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-IOI(24) (20o6); ARIZ.
ADMIN. CODE § R6-io-ioI( 43 ) (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-76-402(a) (2006); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 11322.6 (West 2oo6); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9A-9 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 239B.8(2) (West 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-7,105(b), (c) (2005); MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 44A(i)
(2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-1721 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167:85(1) (2005); 62 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 402 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-3-I54(g) (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-608(D), (E) (2o05); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-3(P) (West 20o6); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.147 (West 20o6); ALA. ADMIN. CODE r.
660-2-20-.02(3) (2005); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 45.260(i) (2oo6); o16-20-OO2 ARK. CODE R. § 3210
(Well 2006); 16-5OOO-5ioo DEL. CODE REGS. §3006.4-.5 (WEIL 2006); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r.
16.O3.o8.i64 (2005); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 112.70,78 (2006); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 44I-93.1o9(2)
(2006); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 30-4-64(b) (2oo6); to6 MASS. CODE REGS. 203.400(A)(2) (2006); Mo.
CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 13, § 40-2.315(I)(A) (2005); MoNT. ADMIN. R. 37.78.807 (2005); 468 NEB. ADMIN.
CODE § 2-020.o6A-J (2005); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. He-W 6o2.o6(b)(6), (c)(I) (2005); OKLA.
ADMIN. CODE §340:10-2-1(2) (2005); OR. ADMIN. R. 461-190-o161(4) (2005); 55 PA. CODE
§ 165.3i(a)(4), (c)(1) (2006); TENN. COMP. R. & REoS. 1240-1-49.03(2) (2006); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.
986-200-210(5) (2005); 13-170-003 VT. CODE R. § 2364 (2006); 22 VA. ADMIN. COoE § 40-35-10, Ion(D),
(E) (2005); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-310-0200(2) (2006); Wis. ADMIN. CODE DWD § 12.16 (2006);
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providing child-care for other TANF recipients as a separate work
activity.8' Few states altogether exclude other federally authorized
activities, but when they do, community service is the most commonly
eliminated." What these two activities have in common is that both are
unpaid and are not primarily designed to enhance future employability.
Indeed, even states that retain "community service" in their list of
authorized work activities sometimes define it narrowly by requiring that
the activity provide job-related experience; s" doing so largely eliminates
any difference between "community service" and "work experience."5 A
few states carry through this focus on paid employment by also
eliminating one or more of the federally authorized educational
activities..
CAL. MANUAL § 42-716.111 (West 2006); IND. CLIENT ELIG. SYS. PROGRAM POL'Y MAN. § 2540.10.00,
http://www.in.gov/fssa/families/manual.html [hereinafter IND. MANUAL]; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 3788(6), (io) (2005) (not listing this activity). But see io-i44-6o7 ME. CODE R. § 3(IV)(A)(3)
(Weil 2005) (listing it); MONT. ADMIN. R. 37.78.103(60) (2005) (incorporating federally authorized
activities by reference).
82. If such care is provided for pay it could be included as a form of employment. When unpaid, it
is sometimes included as a form of "community service" even if not listed as a separate work activity.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:1O-34, -57 (West 2oo6); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 388-310-1400 (2oo6); S.D.
ADMIN. R. 67:i0:O6:05, 67:IO:O6:i 1 (2005); W. VA. MANUAL ch. 24.10.
83. NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-1721 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167:85(l) (2005) (including
"community services and resources," but apparently referring to receipt rather than performance of
services); 16-5000-5ioo DEL. CODE REGS. § 30O6.4-.5 (Weil 2005); Mo. CODE REGs. ANN. tit. 13, § 40-
2.315(I)(A) (2005); 468 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 2-020.o6A-J (2005); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. He-W
602.o6(b)(6), (c)(I) (2005); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:10-2-1(2) (2005); OR. ADMIN. R. 461-i90-oI6i(4)
(2005); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 986-200-210(5) (2005); IND. MANUAL § 2540.10.00. In some states,
activities that elsewhere might be categorized as "community service" could be categorized as "work
experience" instead.
84. See infra note 91.
85. Compare, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. § 11322.6 (d) (West 2006) (defining "work experience" by
statute as "public or private sector work that shall help provide basic job skills, enhance existing job
skills in a position related to the participant's experience, or provide a needed community service that
will lead to employment"), with CAL. MANUAL § 42-701(c)(3) (2005) (defining "community service" by
regulation as "a welfare-to-work training activity that ... provides participants with basic job skills
that can lead to employment while meeting a community need").
86. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 44(A) (2005) (not including high school or GED preparation);
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-6o8(D), (E) (2005) (same); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:10-2-1(2) (2005) (not
including employment-related education or high school or GED coursework for non-high school
graduates); 22 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 40-35-10, I00(D), (E) (2005) (not including any form of training or
education as a "work activity," but allowing some forms of education to supplement work).
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TABLE I: EXCLUSIONS FROM STATE WORK ACTIVITIES"7
CARE FOR THE CHILDREN OF OTHER COMMUNITY EDUCATIONAL
TANF RECIPIENTS s  SERVICE 89  ACTIVITIES'
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Maryland,
Arkansas, California, Delaware, Indiana, Missouri, Oklahoma,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska, New Virginia
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Hampshire,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Oklahoma,
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, Oregon, Utah
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin
Second, states may provide their own restrictive definitions of
federally allowable activities. For instance, some states require that
"work experience" or "community service" enhance participants' future
employability.9 Other states specifically exclude four-year college, or
particular courses of study, from definitions of vocational education.9"
Third, statewide policies sometimes mandate assignment to
particular activities, functionally eliminating the availability of other
activities that formally appear in the state's definition of work.
Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin, for instance, all permit a wider
range of activities at the beginning of an individual's period on TANF,
but over time progressively narrow the available activities to paid
employment and unpaid work experience.93 Less mechanically, many
states explicitly establish unsubsidized employment as the ultimate goal
87. States are listed as excluding a work activity if either the statute or regulation includes a
comprehensive list of work activities but fails to include an activity in that list. In cases where the list of
activities does not clearly track the federal list, I have resolved ambiguities in favor of inclusion of
federally authorized activities.
88. See supra note 8I.
89. See supra note 83.
90. See supra note 86.
9i. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-76-402(a)(4) (2005) (work experience); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 445.024(I)(d) (West 2005) (community service); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 2561.67 (West 2005)
(community service); 9 COLO. CODE REGS. § 9-2503-1:3.631.2(D) (2oo6) (work experience); CAL.
MANUAL § 42-70I.2(c)(3) (work experience); Id. § 42-701.2(c)(3) (community service). A few states
specifically reject such a limitation for community service. See infra notes 135-36. Some states also
require that "community service" take place under the supervision of an existing organization. See,
e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-76-402(a)(12) (2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256J.56 (West 2005). These are
non-exhaustive lists because many states do not provide detailed definitions of their work activities;
accordingly, with regard to sub-definitions this Article does not attempt to be comprehensive and
provides representative examples only.
92. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 336-a(s) (Consol. 2005); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 49.I47(5m) (West
2006); 016-20-002 ARK. CODE R. § 3252.1 (Weil 2005) (including nursing and accounting but excluding
political science and sociology); MONT. ADMIN. R. 37.78.103(58) (20O5).
93. 55 PA. CODE § 165.31(b), (c) (2005); 13-170-003 VT. CODE R. § 2360.2-.24 (2005); Wis. ADMIN.
CODE DWD § 12.I6(2)(e), 3(e), (4)(c) (2005).
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of work activities,' making clear that unsubsidized employment is the
preferred form of work when it is available.95
Fourth, informal agency practice or an official policy not enshrined
in state law may favor assignment to particular activities. In New York
City in the late 199os, for instance, welfare recipients were routinely
assigned to work experience programs even when they were already
participating in educational activities that could satisfy state and federal
work requirements.
96
Many states have in one or more of these ways embraced even more
tightly than TANF itself what is generally known as a "work first"
approach. "Work first" prioritizes immediate labor force attachment
over long-term employability enhancement through training or other
services.7 As a description of such a policy, the name itself conveys the
idea that it is employment that is really work. Senator Phil Gramm
offered a particularly vivid expression of this view during the PRWORA
debates, declaring,
[W]ork does not mean sitting in a classroom. Work means work....
Ask any of my brothers and sisters what "work" meant on our family's
dairy farm. It didn't mean sitting on a stool in the barn, reading a book
about how to milk a cow. "Work" meant milking cows.98
Identifying exactly why education is not "real work"-beyond the
unhelpful tautology that "work means work" -is complicated by the fact
that "work first" policies often emphasize placement into unpaid
workfare positions. "Work first" proponents like former New York City
welfare commissioner Jason Turner typically defend these positions as
"real work."'  This suggests that lack of pay alone is not disqualifying.
Senator Gramm's invocation of the physical passivity of "sitting" on a
94. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § io8A-27(a) (West 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74-
o8A.200 (West 2005); r6-5ooo-51oo DEL. CODE REGS. §3006 (Weil 2005); MD. CODE REGS.
07.03.03.07(I)(1) (2005).
95. Most states enforce this notion by specifically requiring that TANF recipients accept
employment if it is offered to them. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW. § 3 36-d(I) (Consol. 2005).
96. See Pete Bowles, Victory For Workfare Students, NEWSDAY, June 9, 1998, at Ao5; Legal Aid
Suit Hits Workfare Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1996, at B7 (describing lawsuit charging a "one-size-
fits-all approach" of assigning all recipients to work experience).
97. See AMY BROWN, MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORPORATION, WORK FIRST: How TO
IMPLEMENT AN EMPLOYMENT-FOcUSED APPROACH TO WELFARE REFORM 2 (997), available at
http://www.mdrc.org/publications/129/full.pdf; Karen Czapanskiy, Parents, Children, and Work-First
Welfare Reform: Where is the C in TANF?, 61 MD. L. REV. 308,313 (2002).
98. 141 CONG. REC. S13788 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1995).
99. See JASON TURNER, Effective Work Programs (2002), available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/WelfareTesto4o92.cfm (referring to workfare as "actual work" and
"real work," in contrast to education and training); RON HASKINS & PAUL OFFNER, BROOKINGS INST.,
WELFARE REFORM & BEYOND POLICY BRIEF No. 25, ACHIEVING COMPROMISE ON WELFARE REFORM
REAUTHORIZATION 3 (2003), http://www.brookings.edu/es/researchlprojects/wrb/publications/pb/
pb25.htm (referring to employment, work experience, and community service as "actual work (as
opposed to education or training)").
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stool or in a classroom resonates with "work first" advocates' common
criticisms of welfare recipients for "sitting at home doing nothing" and
for lacking discipline and motivation.'"° Another possibility, often
emphasized by New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, is that
workfare, but not education, "gives back" to the community that
provides welfare."'
b. Broad State Approaches to Work
The "work first" approach is hardly universal. Some states define
work more expansively, especially with regard to unpaid activities
besides workfare. They do so through a number of mechanisms,
including simply adding types of work that do not appear in the federally
authorized list,0 2 defining federally authorized activities to include more
specific activities as examples (for instance, "self-employment" as a type
of "employment"'0 3), and establishing "separate state programs" that
provide state-funded benefits to individuals engaged in specific activities,
usually post-secondary education."4
loo. See, e.g., TURNER, supra note 33. One disturbing aspect of an emphasis on discipline and
structure is its resonance with racialized views of poverty. Consistent with a wide body of scholarship,
sociologist Michle Lamont's research on working class men's views of work and race finds that,
among whites, there is a strong sense of identity built around what she terms a "disciplined self"
associated with steady employment. When these men articulate claims of racial superiority, as they
often do, they tend to do so by attributing to African-Americans and Latinos a lack of self-control. See
MICHhLE LAMONT, THE DIGNITY OF WORKING MEN: MORALITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF RACE, CLASS,
AND IMMIGRATION 24, 57, 61, 132 (2000); see also ROGER WALDINGER & MICHAEL L. LICHTER, How THE
OTHER HALF WORKS: IMMIGRATION AND THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LABOR 171 (2003) (describing
consistent pattern of employer criticism of African-Americans for laziness, poor "work ethic," and
"attitude" manifested in resistance to discipline); WILSON, supra note 3, at 1 13, I i8 (noting prevalence
of employer doubts about the work ethic of urban African-American men). Promoting employment as
a source of discipline and structure of benefit to the worker thus slips too easily into implying that lack
of work is itself caused principally by the personality flaws of the poor. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. MEAD,
BEYOND ENTITLEMENT i8 (1986) ("[T]he main barrier to acceptance [of the poor] is no longer unfair
social structures but their own difficulties in coping, particularly with work and family life."); MEAD,
supra note IO, at 83 ("The middle class and the poor appear to exemplify two different economic
personalities. The first has responded to adversity with greater effort, the other with less."). Research
on low-income communities, and African-American ones in particular, consistently find widespread
affirmation of the work ethic, see EDIN & LEIN, supra note Io, at 19o; WILSON, supra note 3, at 73, and
economic behavior consistent with such expressed views, see WILSON, supra note 3, at 139-46 (finding
that jobless urban African-American men have lower reservation wages than men of other racial
groups, with whites having the highest wage expectations).
IOI. DeParle, supra note 54; accord Diller, supra note 9, at 27.
102. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11322.6 (West 2006).
IO3. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-2B-5(A)(I) (West 2006); OHIo Rev. CODE ANN. § 5107.60
(West 2o06); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.I47(l)(c) (West 2006); Wy. R. & REGS. FAM. SERVS. ch. 1, § 2(f).
"Vocational educational training" may be defined to include post-secondary education. See, e.g., ARK.
CODE ANN. § 2o-76-4o2(a)(7) (2005) (including four-year colleges and universities); id. § 20-76-
443(a)(3) (including study time); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11322.6(m) (including college); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 40-5.1-9(C)(2)(I) (2006). "Community service" is especially flexible. See infra note 133 and
accompanying text.
104. For a technical explanation of separate state programs, see supra note 67. Maine pioneered
this approach to permitting post-secondary education with its Parents as Scholars program. See ME.
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Through these techniques, some state TANF programs have
adopted broad meanings of work that include five major types of activity
outside the "work first" duo of paid employment and unpaid workfare:
(i) self-employment; (2) education and training, especially post-
secondary education; (3) rehabilitative medical and social services to
address physical or mental disability, domestic violence, or substance
abuse; (4) unpaid care for family members in special circumstances; and
(5) "community service" that extends beyond unpaid volunteering with
established organizations.
Although not universally adopted, self-employment has provoked
little controversy as a work activity, presumably because of broad
political support for entrepreneurship and a close fit with an emphasis on
generating earned income. I 5 It does, however, raise interesting questions
about how to allocate credit for hours of work, what level of state
monitoring is appropriate for work activities, and how important it is that
an individual's work be subject to supervision within a larger institutional
setting. If the disciplinary aspects of workfare are what justify calling it,
but not college, "work," then self-employment should be a difficult case.
"Being your own boss" often appeals precisely due to a deemphasis on
showing up on time and taking orders, demands typical of both low-wage
employment and workfare.'
As Table II shows, many states include post-secondary and other
forms of education in their definitions of work. Doing so rejects to some
extent the "work first" approach, continuing a longstanding debate over
the relative value, and feasibility, of immediate employment versus
enhancement of long-term job prospects. '"7 This debate can be
understood as a family argument among those committed to economic
self-sufficiency through employment but divided merely over how to
achieve that goal. At the margins, though, are suggestions that higher
education's value as work also derives from the effort, perseverance, and
talent required to succeed (evoking self-improvement), or from
facilitating effective contributions as a political participant, community
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3790 (2005); Friedman, supra note 46; REBEKAH J. SMITH ET AL., MAINE
EQUAL JUSTICE PARTNERS, PARENTS AS SCHOLARS: EDUCATION WORKS 3 (2OO2), available at
http://www.mejp.org/PDF/pas.pdf; Sen. Olympia J. Snowe, Education Transitions American Families
Off Welfare, WKLY. SENATE UPDATE (Aug. 20 2004), http://snowe.senate.gov/wsuo8-2o-o4.htm. A
number of other jurisdictions have since followed suit. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 4-205.i9g(a)(6) (2oo6);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-4-212(2)(t) (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-2D-4; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1122
(2006); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 4 2-2-10 3 (b)(x) (2006).
105. See generally NISHA PATEL & MARK GREENBERG, CLASP, MICROENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT AND
SELF-EMPLOYMENT FOR TANF RECIPIENTS: STATE EXPERIENCES AND ISSUES IN TANF REAUTHORIZATION
(2002), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/microenterprise-report.pdf.
io6. See WALDINGER & LICHTER, supra note too, at 38-40; Turner & Main, supra note 43, at 299-
300 (explaining that workfare forces participants to "practice organizing their lives around a realistic
work schedule" and "submit to supervisory authority" in preparation for the private labor market).
lo7. See generally Diller, supra note 9; Friedman, supra note 46.
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member, and parent (evoking reciprocity).'
The last three forms of unpaid work-rehabilitation, unpaid family
care, and "community service" expansively conceived-are where states
have been most innovative, and they raise the biggest questions about
the meaning of work under TANF.
io8. See Rebekah J. Smith et al., The Miseducation Of Welfare Reform: Denying The Promise of
Postsecondary Education, 55 ME. L. REV. 211, 219 (2003); Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Responsible
Republicanism: Educating For Citizenship, 62 U. CHi. L. REv. 131, I8i (1995).
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TABLE II: SELECTED STATE WORK ACTIVITIES NOT EXPLICITLY
INCLUDED IN FEDERAL LAW
ONE OR MORE
POST-SECONDARY REHABILITATIVE CARE FOR A FAMILY
EDUCATION"O SERVICES" o  MEMBER"'
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Based on medical
California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, condition:
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, New York, Texas,
Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Washington, West
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Virginia
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New By a non-parent:
Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Texas, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Hampshire, New Utah, Washington, New York, Washington
Mexico, New York, West Virginia,
North Carolina, Ohio, Wisconsin
Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee,
Vermont, West Virginia,
Wyoming
109. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-299(B) (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-76-402(a)(7) (2005); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 11322.6(m) (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 445.024()(1) (West 2005); 305 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9A-9(h) (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3790 (20O5); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 208.040(5)(2) (West 2oo5); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-4-2I2(2)(t); NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-1721(2) (2005);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167:85(g) (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-2D-4 (West 2006); N.Y. Soc. SERV.
§ 336-a(I) (Consol. 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § Io8A-27.9(c)(4) (West 20o5); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 51O7.58 (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-5.I-9(c)(2),I) (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 28-7A-
22 (2oo6); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-3-I54(g) (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1122; W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-9-7(a) (West 2006); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-Io3(b)(x); 16-5000-5100 DEL. CODE REGS. § 30O6.6
(Weil 2005); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-93.IO9(2)(a)(2) (2006); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 30-4-64(b)(3)
(2006); 921 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 2:370(2)(C) (2005); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.36o1(b)(ii) (2006); see also
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:I0-34, -57 (West 2006) (allowing post-secondary education only when combined
with another work activity); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.147(5m) (West 2oo6) (same).
110. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11322.6(q); IOWA CODE ANN. § 239B.8(2)(i) (West 2005); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 256J.49(13)(9) (West 2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-1721(2) (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-
2B-5 (E); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5107.42, .62, .64; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74 .o8A.250(14) (West
2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-3(e), (p); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 4 9.147 (5)(I)(b); 16-5OOO-51oo DEL. CODE
REGS. § 3006.4; FLA. ADMIN CODE ANN. r. 65A-4.2o6(2), (7) (2oo6); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89,
§ 112.70(a)-(c) (2006); 921 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 2:370(2)(C)(IO); io6 MASS. CODE REGS. 203.400(A)(2)(e)
(2oo6); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. HE-W 637.J8 (2005); 4o TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 811.32(a)(i)(B)
(2006); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 986-200-210(5)(d) (2005); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-310-0200(2)(1), -
1400(2)(d) (2006); see also N.Y. Soc. SERV. § 335-b(5)(e)(i) (recipient complying with treatment plan
"deemed" to satisfy work requirement); STATE OF GEORGIA, GEORGIA's TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR
NEEDY FAMILIES STATE PLAN FOR FY 2003, at io (2o2), available at http://dfcs.dhr.georgia.gov/DHR-
DFCS/DHR-DFCSCommonFiles/ 492o828TANFPlanFY2003.pdf [hereinafter GEORGIA TANF
PLAN].
1i. N.Y. Soc. SERV. § 332(1)(c); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-3(e), (p); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89,
§ 112.70(f); 106 MASS. CODE REGS. 203.400(A)(2)(g); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 1300.9(7)
(2006); 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 8i1.32(a)(3); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-3Io-1400(2)(a)-(b); W. VA.
MANUAL ch. 24.Io(C); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 51o7.60 (treating as "community service" an
adult caretaker's "involve[ment] in the minor child's education on a regular basis"); GEORGIA TANF
PLAN, supra note Ito, at 9.
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A minority of states, listed in Table II, now explicitly include as
work professional rehabilitative services that assist welfare recipients to
overcome or mitigate the effects of poor health, domestic violence, or
substance abuse. This is a new development under TANF. Predecessor
programs did not include such services under the rubric of work
activities,"' nor were they proposed for inclusion in TANF work
activities during the welfare reform debates of the I99os."' In this regard,
they are unlike education and training, which were prominent parts of
pre-TANF welfare work programs '  and were a major point of
contention as Congress drafted TANF."'
At the appropriate level of abstraction, however, these rehabilitative
programs look very similar to education and training. They are time-
intensive activities that can improve long-term prospects for employment
by changing recipients' personal characteristics. California is typical in
including participation in those "[m]ental health, substance abuse, and
domestic violence services.., that are necessary to obtain and retain
employment."
'' 6
Indeed, this common connection to employability and in turn to
economic self-sufficiency is invoked by what has become the standard
umbrella terminology for these programs: services designed to address
"barriers to employment" or "barriers to self-sufficiency," shortened to
"barrier removal activities.".. 7  Policymakers' and program
administrators' adoption of these terms follows the lead of researchers
who coined them. The "barriers" concept refers not only to the need for
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 682(d) (1996) (listing mandatory and permissive activities for JOBS, the work
program for AFDC). Some states now classify rehabilitative activities as a form of "job readiness," 468
NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 2-020.o6D. HHS SHOULD EXERCISE OVERSIGHT, supra note 24, at Ii, a category
that did exist under JOBS, 42 U.S.C. § 682(d)(I)(A)(i)(III) (1996), but which then was defined more
narrowly to refer to activities focused on "general workplace expectations," and "work behaviors and
attitudes." 45 C.F.R. § 250.44(c) (i996).
113. They were absent, for instance, from Democratic objections to the Republican-supported bills
and from the most liberal Democratic alternative. See H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 2027-30 (1996); 141
CONG REC. H3742 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (substitute offered by Rep. Mink).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 682(d)(i)(A)(i) (1996) (mandating that AFDC/JOBS programs make available
both "educational activities" and "job skills training").
115. See H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 2027-30 (1996) (asserting that "true welfare reform" requires
"adequate education, training, and child care, and jobs that pay a livable wage"); id. at 872 (describing
party-line defeat of amendment to PRWORA that would have included post-secondary education as a
work activity).
116. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § I1322.6(q) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
117. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5 107.4 2(B) (West 2o06); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-3(d), (e), (p) (West
2006) (authorizing work activities designed to address "challenges" defined as "any fact, circumstance,
or situation that prevents a person from becoming self-sufficient or from seeking, obtaining, or
maintaining employment of any kind, including physical or mental disabilities, lack of education,
testing, training, counseling, child care arrangements, transportation, medical treatment or substance
abuse treatment"); 468 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 2-020.06; N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. HE-W 637.18
(2005).
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rehabilitative services but also to weak job skills, limited English
proficiency, family members' acute needs for care, and ultimately to
anything that correlates with low employment rates or low earnings."' At
this level of abstraction, participating in professional interventions either
by medical and social service providers or by educators serves the same
function of improving subsequent employment prospects.
In many cases, states even have catchall categories of work activities
that include anything that, in the words of a Delaware regulation,
"assist[s] in obtaining or maintaining employment or improving work
performance.""..9 To see how extraordinarily broad such a category might
be, consider that at least four states explicitly permit a housing search by
a homeless individual to count as work,' ° and that Utah includes the
process of relocating out of a rural area.'2 ' Counterintuitive as it may
seem to count going to the doctor, let alone shopping for an apartment,
as work, it does make sense if achieving economic self-sufficiency is the
essence of work, and if that achievement includes a cumulative process,
not simply an on/off decision to get a job. Because lacking a permanent
home interferes with obtaining and maintaining employment,'22 as does
living in an isolated area with a weak job market, removing either
limitation could be as important as obtaining a GED.
These new categories of work are subject to the same critique that
"work first" proponents have long lodged against education: that they
dilute the employment goal by permitting recipients to defer getting a
job. "'23 In this sense, permitting any form of barrier removal activity could
118. See Sandra K. Danziger & Kristin S. Seefeldt, Barriers to Employment and the "Hard To
Serve": Implications for Services, Sanctions, and Time Limits, 22 Focus 76 (2002), available at
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/focus/pdfs/foc22I-part3.pdf#page=26 (defining "barriers to
employment" as "personal and family challenges [that] impede welfare recipients' ability to find
jobs."); THE LEWIN GROUP, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, EMPLOYING WELFARE RECIPIENTS WITH
SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS TO WORK: LESSONS FROM THE DISABILITY FIELD 3-6 (200O), available at
http://www.aecf.org/publications/welfareanddisabilities.pdf; SHEILA R. ZEDLEWSKI, URBAN INST.,
SNAPSHOTS OF AMERICA'S FAMILIES No. 3, WORK AND BARRIERS TO WORK AMONG WELFARE RECIPIENTS
IN 2002, at I (2003), available at http://www.urban.org/Uploadedpdf/3io836-snapshots3-no3.pdf
(defining "barriers to work" as "those shown in an earlier study to significantly reduce work activity"
and including physical and mental, lack of education, lack of recent work experience, infant child,
disabled child, and Spanish as primary language).
ri9. 16-5000-5ioo DEL. CODE REGS. § 3OO6.I (Weil 2005); accord CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 11322.6(r) (authorizing "activities necessary to assist an individual in obtaining unsubsidized
employment").
12o. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-2B-5(E)(3) (West 2006); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5107.64(C); io6
MASS. CODE REGS. 203.400(A)(2)(J) (2006); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-310-0200(2)(1) (2006).
121. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 9 86-200-210(5)(f) (2005).
122. See BARBARA SARD, CrR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, A HOUSING PERSPECrIVE ON TANF
REAUTHORIZATION AND SUPPORT FOR WORKING FAMILIES 1-3 (2002), available at http://www.cbpp.org/
3-12-o2hous.pdf; HEIDI GOLDBERG, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, IMPROVING TANF PROGRAM
OUTCOMES FOR FAMILIES WITH BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT 9 (2002), available at http://www.cbpp.org/
I-22-o2tanf 3 .pdf.
123. Diller, supra note 9; Haskins, supra note 3, at 26.
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be seen as weakening work requirements, if obtaining paid employment
is the central goal and if transfer recipients engage in these activities
instead of taking a job.
In a different way, however, a broader definition of work may
actually expand the reach of work requirements and tighten their grip on
the lives of transfer recipients. This expansion occurs when demands for
work are no longer limited by current labor market prospects, but instead
widen to include insistence that welfare recipients take substantial action
to become employable in the future even if they genuinely cannot get a
job at the moment.
This transformation is quite literally visible in the structure of state
TANF work requirements. For instance, Minnesota recently abolished
nearly all of its exemptions from work requirements in favor of a policy
of "universal participation." '24 Before June 30, 2004, individuals were
excused from work based on age, illness, incapacity, or "the need for a
person to provide assistance in the home" for medical reasons.'25 Now,
these same individuals are to follow an "employment plan.., tailored to
recognize the special circumstances of caregivers and families including
limitations due to illness or disability and caregiving needs. '' 1, 6 Anything
specified in such a plan may be deemed a "work activity," including
"preemployment activities" such as "chemical and mental health
assessments, treatment, and services; learning disabilities services; child
protective services; family stabilization services," and anything that
"address[es] safety, legal, or emotional issues, and other demands on the
family as a result of... family violence.' 27 Thus, circumstances once
passively accepted as justifying exemption from a work obligation
increasingly are recast as temporary conditions the active overcoming of
which is mandatory as part of the obligation to work. '
Even the most committed proponents of self-sufficiency recognize
that immediate, full-time employment should not be expected of all
transfer recipients because such employment may be unavailable or
124. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256J.56I (West 2005).
125. These exemptions from work requirements had once been mandated by the AFDC/JOBS
program that preceded TANF. 42 U.S.C. § 6o2(a)(i9)(C) (1996).
126. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256J. 5 6(b), with id. § 25 6J.561(2)(d).
127. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256J.49(13), .52I(2), (3). Similar policies have been put in place in Ohio
and Wisconsin. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5107.42 (West 2006); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.147(5) (West
2006). A number of other states take an intermediate approach, continuing to use the language of
"exemptions" but making qualification for the exemption itself contingent on participating in activities
that mitigate or remove the "barrier to employment." See 62 PA. CONS. STAT. § 405.i(a.3)(1); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 114(b)(3) (2006); FLA. ADMIN CODE ANN. r. 65 A-4.2o6(2), (7) (2006); N.M. CODE R.
§ 8.102.46O.11(D); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 1300.2(e) (2006); 13-170-003 VT. CODE R.
§ 2365.31-32 (2006); Wy. R. & REGS. FAM. SERVS. ch. i, § 8(d)(2)(A).
128. For a theoretical justification of this approach, see generally Amy L. Wax, Disability,
Reciprocity, and "Real Efficiency": A Unified Approach, 44 WM. MARY L. REV. 1421 (2003).
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unduly burdensome. What "universal engagement" approaches such as
Minnesota's do, however, is conceptually link those who decline an
appropriate job when one is available with those who decline an
appropriate opportunity to increase their future employment prospects.
Jason Turner, an architect of both Wisconsin's and New York City's
1990s welfare reforms that included universal engagement policies,
characterizes such policies as an antidote to welfare recipients "staying at
home doing nothing to help themselves become self-sufficient."' 29
In contrast to Turner's advocacy of universalizing participation in
employment or work experience programs, some states use the universal
engagement concept to remove the "doing nothing" label from those
actively engaged in daily efforts other than wage earning. Wide-ranging
consequences follow from this shift in classification. On the one hand,
recipients become subject to the sanctions for non-work, which could
now include missing a therapist's appointment. On the other, they may
become eligible for "work supports" (such as subsidized therapy, and
child-care during the session) that could enable access to services
previously out of reach for financial and other reasons. The precise
implications of this shift in classification will depend in part on how
exclusively the characterization as work is grounded in prospects for
future employment.'30 In other words, what is the relative importance of
the "doing something" versus the "becoming self-sufficient" components
of Turner's formulation?
So long as employment remains the ultimate goal, there is an
unavoidable tension between two different dimensions along which that
goal may be pursued. For any given individual, permitting "barrier
removal activities" to satisfy work requirements (and thus maintain
transfer eligibility) can reduce the pressure to find employment; but for
the population of transfer recipients as a whole, including these activities
as a form of work makes it easier for work requirements to be a universal
feature of transfer receipt. There is a tension, that is, between
recognizing only a narrow conception of "real work" and positing work
as a universal enterprise that binds together all transfer recipients and
links them to the citizenry more broadly. 3'
Facilitating future employment, however, is not the only way in
129. TURNER, supra note 33.
130. Recasting day-to-day struggles to manage and overcome difficult circumstances as fields of
activity and accomplishment, not simply passive excuses, resonates strongly with important strands of
disability rights and family violence movements. But what are the subtle effects of articulating the
significance of these struggles as achieving the status of a paid worker, and being obligated to do so?
Cf. MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS & OTHER WRITINGS 90 (Colin
Gordon ed., i98o) (analyzing power as a relation inscribed "in the bodies themselves of each and
everyone of us").
131. See HANDLER, supra note 74, at 4-15 (discussing arguments for work as a form of social
inclusion).
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which participating in therapeutic services can be cast as work.
Enhancing employability is not, after all, the only or often even the
primary motivation for overcoming domestic violence, treating an illness,
or finding a place to call home. 32 Instead, like an education, they may be
of much broader value both to the individual and to others. Washington
State illustrates this point by classifying substance abuse treatment and
domestic violence services as work under the rubric of "community
service" rather than "barrier removal."'33
Indeed, Washington's general definition of "community service" is
startlingly broad: any "activity approved by your case manager which
benefits you, your family, your community or your tribe."'"
Connecticut's "community service" definition- "community
enhancement as opposed to improving the employability of the
individual"' 35-explicitly establishes this concept of conferring some
benefit as a basis for work, independent of any connection to future
employment. '36
The scope of "community service" is thus a key site for exploring the
relationship between self-sufficiency and reciprocity accounts of work
requirements. In contrast to Connecticut's approach some states render
community benefits strictly supplemental to employability goals. They do
so either by eliminating community service as a category distinct from
"work experience," '3 or by- requiring that community service positions
enhance employability.' Florida law, for instance, provides that
"community service" is "job training experience. '
Fitting rehabilitation under the "community service" rubric, without
an employability link, requires a particularly broad conception of which
132. Samuel Bagenstos observes that a similar duality has become a sticking point in the
interpretation of the ADA's "reasonable accommodation" requirement, as courts have refused to
require accommodations that benefit individuals with disabilities throughout their lives, even if they
are also necessary to enable employment. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, I 4
YALE L.J. 1, 35-36 (2004).
133. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-310-1400 (2006); see also W. VA. MANUAL ch. 24.Io(G). Although
not reflected in its statutes or regulations, Kansas also appears to classify substance abuse treatment
and mental health counseling as "community service." See HHS SHOULD EXERCISE OVERSIGHT, supra
note 24, at 12, 30.
134. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-3IO-1400(I)(b).
135. CONN. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, JOBS FIRST EMPLOYMENT SERVICES PROGRAM PROCEDURES
MANUAL app. A. (2006), available at http://www.ctdol.state.ct.us/weltowrk/allpdf/2oo6.pdf.
136. See also ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 45.260(i)(I) (2006) ("achieves a useful public purpose
and contributes to the common good" and includes "subsistence activities"); GEORGIA TANF PLAN,
supra note IIo, at 9 ("provides a service to the community" and "may not lead to skill development or
employment"); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:90-4.2 (2006) ("increase the common good and/or improve the
condition of the community").
137. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text; see also Diller, supra note 9, at 22-27
(discussing shifting emphases on employability and reciprocity aspects of work experience).
138. See supra note 91.
139. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 445.024(0) (West 2005).
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benefits will be considered "community" benefits. Once such "service"
includes benefits concentrated on the recipient, or on other members of
her family, the category becomes extremely broad.40 Washington is the
only state that expressly articulates such a general principle of including
"benefits [to] you [or] your family" in community service, but others do
so implicitly. Alaska, for instance, cites "subsistence activities" as an
example of community service that "achieves a useful public purpose and
contributes to the common good.'' 4  Here, "self-sufficiency" and
"community service" appear to merge.
Broad conceptions of public purpose or common good can also
erode the distinction between reciprocity and self-improvement
approaches to work requirements. If the well-being of the individual
recipient and the community are intertwined, then what makes work
good for the worker and her family also makes it good for the
community. Indeed, many states authorize, or even mandate, as work
activities a battery of professional services that seem to have little
connection either to improving employability or to benefiting anyone
economically. What these "life skills" programs in parenting, financial
literacy, and family planning share with employment appears to be the
inculcation of comprehensive middle-class behaviors.'42 In such activities,
we can see the ascendancy of a self-improvement orientation in which
the economic features of work are distinctly secondary.
Unpaid caregiving is perhaps the most intriguing way in which some
states untether community service from widely diffused public benefits
mediated by governmental or charitable organizations. Four states treat
care of other TANF recipients' children as "community service,' 43 and of
course the federal TANF statute itself treats such care as a distinct work
activity.'
With regard to members of the recipient's own household, however,
the picture is more complicated. No state counts as work parents' care
140. Some states require that "community service" take place within the rubric of established non-
profit or charitable organizations, thereby spreading the benefits of community service work beyond
oneself and one's family. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-76-402(a)(12) (2005); CAL. MANUAL § 42-
701.2(c)(3) (1999); see also 9 COLO. CODE REGS. § 9-2503-1:3.63I.2(G) (2oo6) (requiring that
community service "provides a service to the community at large").
141. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 45.260(i)(I), 0)(2) (2oo6).
142. See. e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 239B.8(2)(h) (West 2oo5); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5107.64
(West 2006); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-93.109(2)(a)(i) (2oo6); 921 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 2:370(2)(c)(IO)
(2005); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1240-I-49.03(2)(b) (2006). Florida exempts parents of newborn
children from work requirements "except that the parent may be required to attend parenting classes
or other activities to better prepare for the responsibilities of raising a child." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 445.024(3)(d) (West 2005). Louisiana requires that "[plarticipants who are pregnant or who have a
child under age one ... be assigned to specialized work activities that include parenting education."
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:231.7(B)(i) (2oo6).
143. See supra note 82.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 6o7(d)(I2) (2006).
June 2006]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
for their own healthy children.'45 Georgia, New York, Washington, and
West Virginia, however, do allow as "community service" care for family
members with special needs arising from illness or disability. 46 Special
health considerations aside, New York and Washington allow care for
children in the TANF recipient's own household to count as community
service work, but only when the recipient is the child's grandparent'47 or
foster parent;' 48 the same care by a parent does not qualify. Several other
states allow similar family caregiving as standalone work activities,
without placing them under the rubric of community service. 49 Although
these examples are quite limited, they suggest the beginnings of a
transformation similar to what we observed with rehabilitative services,
one in which meeting needs for family caretaking starts to be treated as a
form of work rather than as an excuse from it, and as a form of "doing
something."
Both the "barriers to self-sufficiency" and "community service"
rubrics developed in many states possess striking flexibility, depending
on how attenuated a link to employment or how broad a conception of
community is permitted. Because most activities that are candidates for
"work" have complex characteristics, they can be incorporated into
different frameworks for work requirements by emphasizing different
aspects of the activity.
One striking example that ties together many of these threads comes
from West Virginia. Its statute classifies as work both caring for disabled
family members and rehabilitative services. They are grouped together
145. Ohio, however, does include parents' involvement in their children's education as a work
activity. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5107.60. Also, a number of states have experimented with At-Home
Infant Care (AHIC) programs that allow poor or near-poor parents of infants to receive payments at
or near the state reimbursement level for infant child-care subsidies, although these have not been
integrated into state TANF programs. See NAT'L CHILD CARE INFO. CrR., AT-HOME INFANT CARE
INITIATIVES SPONSORED BY STATES I (2oo6).
146. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 332(I)(C) (Consol. 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-3(e), (p) (West
2006); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REDS. tit. 12, § 1300.9(7) (2006); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-310-
1400(2)(a)-(b) (2006); GEORGIA TANF PLAN, supra note I1o, at 9; W. VA. MANUAL ch. 24.Io(C) (2oo6).
In addition, a recent U.S. General Accounting Office survey of selected states found that Maryland
and Wisconsin also classify care for disabled family members as "community service" for the purpose
of reporting their work participation rates to the federal government. See HHS SHOULD EXERCISE
OVERSIGHT, supra note 24, at 11.
147. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 3 88-3IO-1400(2)(b).
148. N.Y. CoMP CODES R. & REGS. tit 12 § 130o.9(a)(7) (2006); see also Welfare Information
Network, TANF Recipients as Caregivers for Family Members with Disabilities, RESOURCES FOR
WELFARE DECISIONS, Apr. 2002, http://www.financeproject.org/Publications/
TANFrecipientsascaregiversRN.htm. It is unclear whether the federal government would accept such
a classification for TANF participation rate purposes were it ever to be put in issue, but proposed
amendments to TANF to require that community service be "supervised" appear designed to preclude
such a possibility. See discussion infra note 178 and accompanying text.
149. Texas allows family caregiving for the care of ill or disabled family members. 40 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 811.32(a)(3) (2006). Illinois and Massachusetts do so for child-care by non-parents. ILL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 112.70(f) (2oo6); I06 MASS. CODE REGS. 203.400(A)(2)(g) (20o6).
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under the heading of activities addressing "challenges" that interfere
with "seeking, obtaining, or maintaining employment.' 5. In other words,
where Washington treats rehabilitation as community service (like
caregiving), the West Virginia statute treats caregiving as "barrier
removal" (like rehabilitation). 5' This categorization is puzzling because
caretaking does not obviously enhance the caretaker's future
employability, or aim to, even though time devoted to it competes with
employment and thus the need for it correlates with reduced
employment and earnings.5 '
At the extreme, though, just giving an activity a name, a purpose,
and a place in a monitored "plan," rather than focusing on a passive state
of need-caring for a disabled child, not having a disabled child in the
household-permits a connection to ideas of activity, "engagement," and
supervision associated with employment, and with work more generally.
Moreover, if requiring someone to show up on time to pick up trash and
follow orders about how to do so inculcates the traits necessary for
employment, then perhaps so too does requiring someone to show up on
time to a medical appointment and follow a doctor's orders for
treatment. 53 In these ways, a single activity can be characterized as
responsive to quite different approaches to work. The persuasiveness of
this categorization nonetheless may vary depending on which approach is
most important. If it turned out to be false that a substance abuse
treatment program increased future employment but true that it had
other positive social consequences (reduced crime, improved parenting,
etc.), it might matter whether "barrier removal" or "community service"
was the basis for including program participation as a work activity.
2. Work Activities in Practice: What TANF Recipients Actually Do
Not only do states adopt varied approaches to work at the level of
formal policy, but they also vary at the level of outcomes, what TANF
recipients actually are doing. Establishing a causal connection between
these policies and outcomes is extraordinarily difficult, and not a task I
undertake here.'54 Nonetheless, a number of patterns suggest such a
15o. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-3(e); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256J. 5 6i( 2 ) (West 2005).
151. At the same time, West Virginia places these activities that address "challenges to
employment" into a category named "community or personal development," and the regulations
transform many of its elements back into "community service." See W. VA. MANUAL ch. 24.10 (2oo6).
152. See supra note i I8.
153. Washington's very broad definition of "community service," for instance, coexists with the
requirement that the community service activity "promote a strong work ethic." WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 74-o8A.330 (West 2005).
154. Its difficulty stems from the wide array of factors that may influence recipient behavior. For
instance, a low rate of employment among current TANF recipients could reflect either state policy
deemphasizing immediate employment, or a benefit structure that causes small amounts of earned
income to defeat benefit eligibility. Other considerations include local labor market conditions,
caseload characteristics, and other government programs that affect the costs and benefits of
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connection and demonstrate that welfare programs can operate with
meaningfully different mixes of activities used to satisfy work
requirements. This shows at a minimum that changes in work definitions
could make a difference. Eliminating activities would require significant
numbers of current recipients to do something different or lose benefits.
Adding activities would allow current recipients either to shift to new
work activities or to be reclassified from "non-working" to "working"
status. Either change would affect a state's ability to meet federal
participation rates.
As an initial matter, unsubsidized employment is by far the most
common TANF work activity. Nationally, roughly 50% of TANF
recipients engaged in any work activity were in unsubsidized
employment.'55 A little over 20% were engaged in work experience or
community service, and roughly the same number engaged in some form
of educational activity, principally vocational education.
These national aggregates, however, mask substantial inter-state
variation. In the ten states with the highest unsubsidized employment
rates among participating adults, the average unsubsidized employment
rate was 73%, I57 but in the ten lowest, that rate was 17%.58
Moreover, states vary considerably in their mix of work activities
other than unsubsidized employment. Even among states committed to
employment as "work first," this measure shows differences in their
employment, education, and other activities. For research on the causes of welfare caseload decline
and increased employment among low-skilled single mothers, see generally Bruce D. Meyer & Dan T.
Rosenbaum, Welfare, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Labor Supply of Single Mothers, 66 Q. J.
ECON. io63 (2ooi); Rebecca M. Blank, Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United States, 40 J. EcoN.
LITERATURE 1105 (2002).
155. 2004 Participation Rates, supra note 64, at tbl.6B.
156. Id. i8% engaged in job search. The numbers sum to more than too% because individuals may
engage in more than one activity. Notably, unsubsidized employment recently declined in importance,
from 59% to 48% between 2002 and 2004, while participation in community service or work
experience markedly increased, from 15.4% to 21.2%. Compare id., with Memorandum from U.S.
Dept. of Health and Human Services, Office of Family Assistance to State Agencies Administering
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program tbl.6B (Sep. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/particip/indexparticip.htm (providing participation rate data for
2002).
157. This figure represents the author's calculation for California, Connecticut, Delaware, District
of Columbia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Rhode Island, and Virginia. See 2004 Participation
Rates, supra note 64.
158. This figure represents the author's calculation for Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Puerto Rico, South Dakota, Virgin Islands, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See id. In
absolute terms, however, a state with a high employment rate relative to other work activities may still
have a low employment rate as a percentage of the total caseload. In California, for instance, 70% of
those in any work activity are in unsubsidized employment, but those so employed constitute only
25% of the total caseload. In Ohio, only 30% of those in any work activity are in unsubsidized
employment, but those so employed constitute 24% of the total caseload. The discrepancy arises
because a much higher proportion of all adults are in any work activity in Ohio (78%) than in
California (36%). Id. at tbls.6B & 6C.
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second choices. It is also the measure most likely to reflect deliberate
policy choices among definitions of work.'59 In the top ten states, on
average 6o% of "working" recipients participate in unpaid work
experience or community service.'6 At the opposite extreme, in the
bottom ten states only 2% do.' 6' There is less, but still substantial, state-
to-state variation in the importance of educational and training activities.
In the top ten states, on average 45% of "working" recipients participate
in some form of education or training, I6, while in the bottom ten, 7% do
SO. 63
States appear not simply to trade off between employment and one
favored class of unpaid activities. Instead, as Table III shows, some states
have high levels of both work experience/community service and
education/training, while others emphasize one strongly over the other or
rely almost exclusively on employment.
TABLE III: COMBINATIONS OF UNPAID WORK ACTIVITIES 164
WORK EXPERIENCE & COMMUNITY SERVICE
Top TEN BOTTOM TEN
TRAINING Top TEN West Virginia, NoneWisconsinEDUCATION BOTTOM TEN Delaware, Kansas, District of Columbia,
E Wyoming Michigan, Tennessee
Unfortunately, the existing data make it impossible to track how
many TANF recipients actually are taking advantage of the more
159. In the short term, different unpaid activities have the same economic consequences for
participants, so they are less sensitive to labor market conditions and the availability of employment-
linked benefits. Also, unlike private sector hiring, states can control whether a placement is available
in activities such as work experience or vocational education. Furthermore, the percentage of a
caseload in paid employment depends on the level of earnings at which benefit eligibility is lost:
employment at a given level of earnings will, in a low benefit state, result in leaving welfare altogether,
but in a high benefit state, it will result in staying on welfare but counting toward meeting the
participation rate. JASON TURNER, EFFECTIVE WORK PROGRAMS (2004), http://www.heritage.org/
Research/Welfarefresto4o9o2.cfm.
16o. This figure represents the author's calculation for Delaware, Kansas, Montana, Ohio, Puerto
Rico, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See 2004 Participation
Rates, supra note 64, at tbl.6B.
161. This figure represents the author's calculation for California, Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. See id.
162. This figure represents the author's calculation for Colorado, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Utah, Virgin Islands, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id. This
aggregation masks variation in the type of education or training activity involved. For instance,
Wisconsin relies heavily on "job skills training" and "education related to employment," while West
Virginia has very low rates in those categories but high ones in "vocational education" and
"satisfactory school attendance." Id.
163. This figure represents the author's calculation for Delaware, District of Columbia, Kansas,
Michigan, Nevada, New York, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming. See id.
164. See supra notes 16o-63.
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expansive state definitions of work described above.'65 All we know are
how many recipients each state reports as participating in each federally
authorized work activity. This count excludes individuals participating in
supplemental state-defined work activities, and it aggregates individuals
participating in different forms of a single broad category. Thus, of the
approximately i6,ooo Washington recipients engaged in "community
service" each month,' 6 we do not know how many were providing unpaid
care to family members, participating in rehabilitative services, or
providing unpaid services to community organizations. ' 67 Nonetheless,
the data do suggest significant utilization of the more expansive aspects
of the "community service" definition: Washington has by far the highest
number of TANF recipients working in community service'and also has
the most expansive definition of community service.'69
C. REFINING FEDERAL WORK REQUIREMENTS IN TANF
REAUTHORIZATION
The same basic patterns, and many of the particulars, that
characterize state implementation of TANF were also present in leading
Congressional proposals to amend and reauthorize TANF. These
proposals received four years of intensive debate beginning in 2002,
when the original five-year TANF program expired.'7" This congruity is
important because it shows that the states' most innovative and
potentially controversial approaches to work do not reflect idiosyncratic
quirks of ideology or geography. Instead, they have commanded
majority, or near-majority, support in at least one house of the national
165. See HHS SHOULD EXERCISE OVERSIGHT, supra note 24, at 3-4.
166. 2004 Participation Rates, supra note 64, at tbl.6A.
167. See discussion supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text. On the difficulties of categorizing
work activities, see Kaplan, supra note 24, at 35-36.
168. 2004 Participation Rates, supra note 64, at tbl.6A.
169. See discussion supra note 146 and accompanying text; see also HHS SHOULD EXERCISE
OVERSIGHT, supra note 24, at 12-13 (noting how state changes in the classification of rehabilitative and
caregiving activities appear to have caused substantial changes in their reported participation rates).
New York also has a large number of recipients (about 600o) reported as performing community each
month and an expansive community service definition. The New York figures suggest that many
engaged in community service are not performing volunteer work for community organizations
because the state separately lists about 5ooo recipients as engaging in "work experience." 2004
Participation Rates, supra note 64, at tbl.6A. The other jurisdiction with over 5000 recipients engaged
in "community service" is Kansas, which does not define the term in its statute or regulations, see KAN.
ADMIN. REGS. § 30-4-64(b)(6) (2oo6), but appears to construe it broadly in practice. See HHS SHOULD
EXERCISE OVERSIGHT, supra note 24, at 12.
170. For several years Congress passed short-term extensions while attempting to reach agreement
on a comprehensive bill to refine many of TANF's substantive requirements. No such agreement was
reached. As part of a large budget-cutting package, in early 2006 Congress passed a five-year
reauthorization that kept TANF almost entirely in its original form. See supra note 7. It is too early to
know whether Congress will continue to consider substantive changes to TANF now that a long-term
reauthorization is in place.
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legislature."' Additionally, Congress is not constrained formally by
TANF's original terms, as the states have been, and so its actions may
provide a clearer view of what today is perceived as politically credible.
More generally, the TANF reauthorization process provides a window
into how, and how differently, serious and sophisticated policymakers
translate the general terms of the welfare debate into the detailed legal
terms of work requirements, and do so with the benefit of almost ten
years of experience with current law.'72
In some ways, the reauthorization process validated the idea that
TANF's passage reflected a durable, broad consensus about the
centrality of work requirements to welfare. No proposal, not even the
one put forward by left-leaning Democrats without the support of their
party leadership,'73 challenged the basic structural features of TANF that
171. The Republican-controlled House three times approved a comprehensive reauthorization bill
modeled on the Bush Administration's proposal. See Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family
Promotion Act of 2002, H.R. 4737, 1o7 th Cong. (2002), 148 CONC. REC. H259 4 (daily ed. May i6, 2002)
(as passed by House); Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2003, H.R. 4,
io8th Cong. (2003), 149 CONG. REC. H552 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 House Bill] (as
passed by House); Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2005, H.R. 240, io9th
Cong. (2oo5) [hereinafter 20o5 House Bill]; see also Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 4241, Io9th
Cong. §§ 8ooi-8122 (2005), 151 CONG. REC. 1O645 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2005) (as passed by House)
(incorporating 2005 House Bill, supra, into budget reconciliation bill); see also WHITE HOUSE,
WORKING TOWARD INDEPENDENCE (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/02/welfare-reform-announcement-book-all.html [hereinafter 2002 Administration Proposal].
Two basic alternatives were offered by House Democrats, one supported by roughly half the party's
House delegation, see 149 CONG. REC. H465, 513-29 (2003) [hereinafter Progressive Democratic
Proposal], and the other supported by the party leadership and nearly its entire delegation. See Next
Step in Reforming Welfare Act, H.R. 3625, I07th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter House Democratic
Proposal]. Introduced by Rep. Cardin, amendment 2 to 2003 House Bill, supra, failed by vote of 197 to
225. 149 Cong. Rec. H 4 65 , 530-49. In the Senate, bills negotiated by bipartisan super-majorities of the
Finance Committee, or sometimes "tripartisan" ones during the period independent Sen. Jeffords
served on the Committee, were reported out of the Committee but never received a floor vote. See S.
REP. No. Io9-5I at 2-3 (2005) (describing history of Senate Finance Committee TANF reauthorization
deliberations); Personal Responsibility and Individual Development for Everyone (PRIDE) Act, S.
667, io9th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter 2005 Senate Finance Bill]; Personal Responsibility and Individual
Development for Everyone (PRIDE) Act of 2003, H.R. 4, io8th Cong., 149 CONG. REC. Dio9o (daily
ed. Oct. 3, 2003) (as introduced in the Senate by Sen. Grassley pursuant to S. REP. No. io8-i62 (2003))
[hereinafter 2003 Senate Finance Bill]; Work, Opportunity and Responsibility for Kids (WORK) Act
of 2002, H.R. 4737, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REC. S 73 7 2 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) [hereinafter 2002
Senate Finance Bill] (as introduced in the Senate by Sen. Baucus pursuant to S. REP. No. 107-221
(2002)).
172. Reauthorization proceeded in an environment where, in addition to members of Congress
and their staffs, the topic received extensive attention from scholars, think tanks, and advocacy
organizations. See, e.g., THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE, supra note 3; WELFARE REFORM AND BEYOND:
THE FUTURE OF THE SAFETY NET (Isabel V. Sawhill et al. eds., 2002); Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities,
TANF Federal Reauthorization, http://www.cbpp.org/pubs/welfare.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006)
(web page collecting reports); Joint Center for Poverty Research, Welfare Reform Reauthorization
Information Clearinghouse, http://www.jcpr.org/welfarereform-info.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006)
(same); National Center for Children in Poverty Research Forum, Reauthorization,
http://www.researchforum.org/subtopic-summary-3.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2oo6) (same).
173. At the outset of the reauthorization process, Rep. Patsy Mink introduced a bill with broad
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provoked serious opposition in the early 1990s, including the five-year
time limit, '74 state participation rates, and individual work requirements.
Indeed, the general terms of work requirements -the levels of
participation required in each state, the weekly hours of work, and the
firmness of the mandate that individual recipients work-all would have
been strengthened by the leading proposals from both parties.'75
Underneath this consensus, however, are substantial disagreements
over whether and how TANF's definition of work should be clarified or
changed., 6 While everyone pledges allegiance to "work," they mean by it
different things. The approach favored by House Republicans and the
Bush Administration essentially would require that TANF recipients
either find employment or participate in unpaid workfare programs. This
view mirrors the "work first" approach taken by influential jurisdictions
such as Wisconsin and New York City.'77 This further shift toward "work
first" would occur by eliminating from the "core" work activities both
vocational education and providing child-care for others, and by adding
the requirement that both work experience and community service be
support from progressive advocates. See TANF Reauthorization Act of 2001, H.R. 3 113, Io7th Cong.
(2oo); see also Coalition on Human Needs, Representative Mink Introduces TANF Reauthorization
Bill, HUMAN NEEDS REPORT, Oct. 26, 2001, available at http://www.chn.org/humanneeds/oi io26c.html.
After Rep. Mink passed away, Rep. Kucinich offered a very similar bill as a substitute for the bill
backed by the House Republican leadership. Progressive Democratic Proposal, supra note 17I.
Amendment i to 2003 House Bill, supra note 171, failed by a vote of 124 to 300.
174. There have been a number of proposals to retain the five-year time limit but expand
exceptions to it under the banner of "work stops the clock," an approach that would have time limits
run only during periods when an individual is not working. See KATHERINE Ross PHILLIPS, URBAN
INSTIT., EARNING BACK TIME: WHO WOULD BENEFIT FROM WORK-RELATED TIME LIMIT ExEMPTIONS?
(2002), http://www.urban.org/urlprint.cfm?ID=796i; SHAWN FREMSTAD & ZOE NEUBERGER, CrR. ON
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORmES, SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISONS OF TIME LIMIT PROVISIONS IN TANF
REAUTHORIZATION LEGISLATION (2002), http://www.centeronbudget.org/5-3-o2tanf2.pdf.
175. At the time they were announced, the Administration's proposals for increases in state
participation rates and weekly hours requirements surprised experts in TANF policy and politics and
were fiercely opposed by liberal advocacy organizations. See Haskins & Blank, supra note 3, at 17-31
(summarizing major issues for TANF reauthorization and listing the definition of work activities, but
not participation rates or hours requirements); Mark Greenberg, Bush's Blunder, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT, July 15, 2002, at A2, available at http://www.prospect.org/print/VI3/13/Greenberg-m.html;
MARK GREENBERG, CTR. FOR LAW & Soc. POLICY, MOST STATES FAR SHORT OF MEETING H.R. 4
PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS (2003), http://clasp.org/publications/CRS-participation.pdf; MARK
GREENBERG & HEDIEH RAHMANOU, CTR. FOR LAW & Soc. POLICY, IMPOSING A 40-HOUR REQUIREMENT
WOULD HURT STATE WELFARE REFORM EFFORTS 1-5 (2003), http://clasp.org/publications/4o-hours.pdf.
Nonetheless, similar proposals were soon endorsed by leading Democrats and moderate Republicans.
See HASKINS & OFFNER, supra note 99, at I.
176. Other areas of dispute were the magnitude of increases in the state participation rate and
weekly hours requirements, funding levels (especially for child-care), and incorporation of funding
streams and programmatic requirements to promote marriage.
177. Not coincidentally, former Wisconsin governor Tommy Thompson was Secretary of HHS
when the Bush Administration proposal was formulated, and a number of other administrators who
had brought Wisconsin's approach to New York City took up positions at HHS or influential
conservative think tanks. See Margy Waller, New York Program Wrong Model for U.S., L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 2002, at M2.
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"supervised."'' ,8 Nonetheless, these conservative proposals would also
permit brief stints in other activities defined by being "directed at
enabling the family member to work."'79 Grouped together in this
category are rehabilitative services, education and training, and job
search, consistent with the "barriers to employment" framework
discussed above. 8
The competing, politically centrist bills 8' give a more extensive role
to these "barrier removal" activities. In particular, they permit states to
give education and training, including post-secondary education, nearly
equal standing to employment and unpaid work experience."' In these
ways, the centrist bills explicitly embrace the more expansive approaches
to work that some states first developed under the original TANF.'8,
As we saw above, however, increasing future employability is not
the only basis on which activities such as education and rehabilitation
could be interpreted as forms of work. While the House bills explicitly
make such a connection to employment a condition of work status, the
centrist bills are ambivalent and varied. With regard to rehabilitation, the
general definitions of qualifying services omit employment-related
178. 2005 House Bill, supra note 171, § iIo(e). The exact significance of this supervision
requirement is unclear. The Administration proposal does not explain it, and there are neither any
House committee reports on any of the bills nor floor colloquies on these provisions. Nonetheless, the
supervision requirement would cast doubt on some of the more expansive state interpretations of
"community service," especially its application to various forms of family caregiving. According to a
leading proponent, the various new restrictions would ensure the TANF recipients perform "real
work," as distinguished from other activities, especially education and training. 149 CONG. REC. E188
(daily ed. Feb. 12, 2003) (statement of Rep. McKeon).
179. 2005 House Bill, supra note 171, § 11O(e). In addition, beyond the twenty-four core hours of
"direct work activities," the remaining hours of the work requirement could be satisfied by any "other
activities specified by the State." Id. The Administration proposal describes these at various times as
"productive," "constructive," or "leading to self-sufficiency," but the only limitation found in the
House bills is that these "other activities" address one of TANF's specified statutory purposes. Id.
18o. Id.
181. Namely, the bills endorsed by the House Democratic leadership and by the Senate Finance
Committee. See supra note 171.
182. "Vocational educational training" or "vocational education" is retained as a core work
activity. See 2005 Senate Finance Bill, supra note 171, § IO9 (leaving intact existing list of work
activities); 2003 Senate Finance Bill, supra note 171, § io9 (same); House Democratic Proposal, supra
note 171, § 404 (explicitly including post-secondary education); 2002 Senate Finance Bill, supra note
171, § 202 (same). Moreover, each bill contains mechanisms that allow vocational education to count
as a core activity for longer than the twelve months permitted under current law, including
authorization in each of the Senate Finance bills for states to operate programs modeled on Maine's
Parents-as-Scholars program. See 2005 Senate Finance Bill, supra note 171, §§ 107(d), lo 9 (f) (Parents-
as-Scholars); 2003 Senate Finance Bill, supra note 171, §§ 1o7 (d), lO9(f) (same); House Democratic
Proposal, supra note 171, § 404 (extending time limit to twenty-four months); 2002 Senate Finance
Bill, supra note 171, § 202 (extending time limit to twenty-four months). Each bill also allows
substantially longer time periods to be spent in rehabilitative services. See 2005 Senate Finance Bill,
supra note 171, §§ 1o9(f), IO; 2003 Senate Finance Bill, supra note 171, §§ 1O9(f), IIo; House
Democratic Proposal, supra note 171, § 405; 2002 Senate Finance Bill, supra note 171, § 202.
183. E.g., S. ReP. No. 109-51, at 19, 24 (2005).
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restrictions that the House bills include,'84 and the most recently
proposed list of qualifying activities includes parenting skills and
financial literacy training.' 8' These activities appear at most tangentially
related to employment. The basis for including them as work would seem
to rest on some combination of their structured character and anticipated
benefits from participation apart from increasing earnings.
With regard to education, some of the centrist bills make the
inability to obtain adequate employment a prerequisite to allowing post-
secondary education and also require that the course of study enhance
earnings potential.'8 Other bills omit one or both restrictions. Again, at
stake here is whether education's significance is entirely derivative of the
financial aspects of employment, or whether its status as work can either
stand entirely apart from subsequent employment, or can rest on non-
financial aspects of employment, such as occupational choice between
equally remunerative jobs. "
The cleanest break between work and employment comes in two
new work activities included in the most recent Senate Finance bill. First,
mirroring several state provisions, "providing substantial ongoing care"
184. See 2005 Senate Finance Bill, supra note 171, § io 9 (f) (proposed 42 U.S.C. § 6o7(c)(i)(C)(i));
2002 Senate Finance Bill, supra note 171, § 202. The most recent Senate Finance bill does require that
any such activities be part of a state-approved "self-sufficiency plan," but these plans themselves may
address both "self-sufficiency" and "the issue of child well-being." 2005 Senate Finance Bill, supra
note 171, § IIo(a). Employment connections also appear in some aspects related to rehabilitative
services. Id. §§ io9(f) (allowing reduced hours of participation when such a program's "effectiveness in
moving families to self-sufficiency is superior to any alternative activities"), iio (permitting long-term
participation in rehabilitative services that are needed "in order to engage in direct work activities").
185. 2005 Senate Finance Bill, supra note 171, § to9(f) (proposed 42 U.S.C. § 6o7(c)(i)(C)(i)(II));
see also discussion of analogous state work activities, supra note 142 and accompanying text.
186. See 2005 Senate Finance Bill, supra note 171, § Io7(d) (restricting eligibility for Parents-as-
Scholars to recipients who "cannot qualify for employment that pays enough to allow them to obtain
self-sufficiency" and requiring a course of study preparing them for "higher-paying occupations that
are in demand in the State"). Whether these restrictions have significance beyond the rhetorical is less
clear. The earnings level constituting "self-sufficiency" is left to the state to define, so it might be
substantially higher than the level that would disqualify one for TANF benefits, and it is difficult to
imagine any course of study leading to a bachelor's degree that would not leave the degree recipient
with access to employment at higher earnings than at program entry.
187. The House Democratic leadership bill would require that post-secondary education "lead[]to
a credential.., related to employment or a job skill," but without restriction to individuals currently
unable to achieve "self-sufficiency." House Democratic Proposal, supra note 171, § 404. The bill
approved by the Senate Finance Committee in the Io7th Congress, under Democratic control but with
substantial Republican support, contained neither restriction. See 2002 Senate Finance Bill, supra note
171. Finally, the bill supported by the liberal wing of the Democratic party explicitly rejected
restrictions on recipients' course of study. See Progressive Democratic Proposal, supra note 171, § 203
(permitting "higher education" as a work activity "regardless of the content of the course of study").
188. Most advocacy for expanded access to education in TANF is framed in terms of employment
outcomes. See, e.g., Julie Strawn et al., Improving Employment Outcomes Under TANF, in THE NEW
WORLD OF WELFARE, supra note 3, at 223; Sheila R. Zedlweski & Pamela Loprest, Will TANF Work
for the Most Disadvantaged Families?, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE, supra note 3, at 3ix; Peter
Edelman, The True Purpose of Welfare Reform, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2002, at 21.
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to a family member "with a physical or mental impairment" counts as
work.'89 This provision would, for the first time in federal law, explicitly
treat welfare recipients' unpaid family caretaking as a means to satisfy
work requirements. Currently, federal law explicitly recognizes such
caretaking only as the basis for an exception to or a reduction in work
requirements. 9 The accompanying committee report explains that the
bill "recognizes that parents who must engage in substantial, continuous
care of a disabled child or family member are engaged in meaningful
activity."''9 Here, care is incorporated as work through a concept of
active, "meaningful" engagement, without reference either to enhancing
employability or self-sufficiency, or to the public good, except insofar as
"meaningful" implicitly references some social value.'92
The second new work activity that is disconnected from employment
is also the bill's most novel contribution. It includes as work
"participation in programs that promote marriage," such as "marriage
education, marriage skills training, [and] conflict resolution counseling in
the context of marriage."'93 Although promoting marriage has long been
an important theme in welfare policy,'94 this provision would move
189. 2005 Senate Finance Bill, supra note 171, § io9(f); see also 2003 Senate Finance Bill, supra
note 171, § 109.
io. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
191. S. REP. No. 109-5i, at 26 (2005). This presents a striking example of the transformation of
work exemptions into work activities. When the Senate Finance Committee, then under Democratic
control, addressed care for disabled family members in 2002, its bill provided a work "exemption"
when the "demands of caregiving do not allow the recipient to obtain or retain employment." 2002
Senate Finance Bill, supra note 171, § 202. The more politically marginal House Progressive
Democratic Bill takes this further and treats as a work activity care for either family members with
disabilities or children under age six. Supra note 171, § 203. Treating care as work in this way has not
been a high priority of most liberal advocacy groups, but it does appear in the agenda of some feminist
organizations. See, e.g., Domestic Priorities Task Force, Nat'l Council of Women's Orgs.,
Recommendations for TANF Reauthorization, (Apr. 5, 2002), http://www.now.org/issues/economic/
welfare/principles.html.
192. This shift would not, however, create a federal right to provide such care. Instead, whether
unpaid family caretaking may satisfy work requirements is subject to the state's determination that it is
the "most appropriate means.., by which such care can be provided to the child or adult dependent
for care." 2005 Senate Finance Bill, supra note 171, § lo9(f). For a contrary approach under existing
state law, see Care v. Wing, 747 N.Y.S.2d 519 (App. Div. 2002) (reversing sanction for non-compliance
with work assignment where recipient was entitled to an exemption as a caretaker for her
incapacitated mother and was entitled to reject welfare agency's offer to supply a home health aide).
193. 2005 Senate Finance Bill, supra note 171, § io9(g). These marriage-related services, however,
could not count toward the core work requirement. Id. Although marriage is not mentioned explicitly,
the House bills would produce a similar result through a catchall provision permitting any activity that
furthered one of TANF's statutory purposes to count as work but only outside the core requirement.
See, e.g., 2005 House Bill, supra note 171, § I10(e). Promoting marriage is one of those purposes. 42
U.S.C. § 6oi(a) (2000).
194. See Ron Haskins & Isabel V. Sawhill, Work and Marriage: The Way to End Poverty and
Welfare, WELFARE REFORM & BEYOND, Sept. 2003, at 1-4, 6-8, available at http://www.brookings.edu/
es/wrb/publications/pb/pb28.pdf; ROBERT E. RECTOR ET AL., THE HERITAGE FOUND., INCREASING
MARRIAGE WILL DRAMATICALLY REDUCE CHILD POVERTY 11-12 (2003), available at
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toward merging it into the world of work. While in some ways this
provision is startlingly discordant, in other ways this represents only an
incremental step beyond labeling professionalized interventions in
domestic violence or substance abuse as "work."'95 The key distinction is
that no link to employment is invoked. If, however, one conceives of
marriage, as many do, as good for spouses, their children, and society as
a whole,'96 then active engagement in pursuit of that good could fit within
broad conceptions of "community service" that evoke reciprocity
rationales. Similarly, marriage promotion is continuous with self-
improvement rationales that advance various forms of cultural
conformity.'97 Additionally, if one conceives of "self-sufficiency" strictly
in terms of avoiding government transfer payments, encouraging
marriage could, like enforcing child support obligations, promote "self-
sufficiency" among welfare recipients by encouraging them to substitute
spousal support for government benefits.'98
http://www.heritage.orgfResearch/Famiy/Ioader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PagelD=
42509; PAULA ROBERTS, CTR. FOR LAW & Soc. POLICY, A BRIEF COMPARISON OF THE MARRIAGE-RELATED
PROVISIONS IN WELFARE REAUTHORIZATION BILLS PASSED BY THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE AND THE
HOUSE HUMAN RESOURCES SUBCOMMrITEE (2005), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/
sbs-marriage-o6o8o5.pdf; Danielle White & Jan Kaplan, Welfare Information Network, The
State's Role in Supporting Marriage and Family Formation, ISSUE NOTES, June
2003, http://www.financeproject.org/Publications/supportingmarriageandfamilyformationIN.htm; 2002
Administration Proposal, supra note 171 at 1-2, 6-II; see also Haskins, supra note 3, at 9, 29
(describing internal Republican disputes during design of TANF over the degree of emphasis to place
on non-marital births).
195. There remains the practical question of whether marriage-promotion programs can actually
affect marital behavior, a question that is only now beginning to be studied through HHS' "Building
Strong Families" project. See Theodora Ooms, The New Kid on the Block: What is Marriage Education
and Does It Work?, POLICY BRIEF: COUPLES & MARRIAGE SERIES, July 2005, at 6-7 , available at
http://www.clasp.org/publications/marriage-.brief7.pdf (reviewing research on marriage education
programs and noting that existing research focuses on middle- and upper-class white couples and
reports effects on relationship dynamics and satisfaction, not marital formation or stability); White &
Kaplan, supra note 194.
196. There are, however, many reasons to be skeptical of or hostile to efforts to promote marriage
as an anti-poverty device. Objections include discrimination in access to the marriage institution,
critiques of its internal power dynamics, unavailability of suitable partners, risks of psychological or
physical abuse within particular relationships, infringement on control over basic elements of one's
identity and social position, and imposition of particularistic moral values. See MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES
104-o8 (I995); Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, j31 U. PA.
L. REV. 1249, 1251-52, 1338 (1983) (criticizing welfare policies that promote women's economic
dependence on men within marriage); Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS
L.J. 339, 393 (1996); MARTHA FINEMAN ET AL., No PROMOTION OF MARRIAGE IN TANF!,
http://falcon.arts.cornell.edu/ams3/npmposition.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006); NOW LEGAL
DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, LOOKING FOR LOVE IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: THE CASE AGAINST
GOVERNMENT MARRIAGE PROMOTION 1-3, http://www.legalmomentum.org/issues/wel/lookingforlove.pdf
(last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
197. See supra notes 142, 185 and accompanying text.
198. See Zatz, supra note 13. Until recently, promoters of marriage as an anti-poverty and anti-
welfare strategy have made a different link to work, one based on the notion that raising the earnings
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In sum, the treatment of work in Congressional TANF
reauthorization proposals reflects, and sometimes expands, the range of
variation among states in how TANF has been implemented to date. This
in turn reflects unresolved tensions between different approaches to the
role and content of TANF's work requirements. All the leading bills
emphasize self-sufficiency through employment and yet none make it the
exclusive touchstone for work.'99 Work can be a big tent indeed.
D. How WORK DEFINES "WELFARE": TANF's HIDDEN CASELOAD
Thus far, I have focused on what kinds of work recipients of means-
tested TANF welfare must perform in order for them to continue
receiving benefits and for states to continue receiving federal TANF
funds. There is, however, another more subtle and little-noticed type of
work requirement created by TANF, one that connects work under
TANF to work in the EITC. This work requirement focuses exclusively
on paid employment and attaches to a type of benefit known as a "work
support."2" Work supports often are portrayed as fundamentally
different from work-conditioned welfare because they provide extra
benefits to low-income employed people, rather than eliminating
benefits to low-income non-workers. This distinction, however, relies
entirely on the contestable location of an income baseline above which
of men will enable more women to depend on them rather than on welfare. See PHELPS, supra note Io,
at 4, 96, 129; WILSON, supra note 3, at 87-1to. But see FINEMAN, supra note 196, at lo6 (criticizing
paternity establishment and child-support enforcement as part of pattern of eliminating welfare
spending through emphasis on two-parent families). As a descriptive matter, changes in household
structure and access to child-support have always been important determinants of transitions onto and
off of welfare. See MARY Jo BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO
REFORM 28-66 (994); Johanne Boisjoly et al., Trends, Events, and Duration of Initial Welfare Spells,
72 Soc. SERv. REV. 466, 478 (1998); Sandra L. Hofferth et al., Exiting Welfare in the 199os: Did Public
Policy Influence Recipients' Behavior?, 21 Pop. RES. & POL'Y REV. 433, 44o-4I, 451-60 (2002); PAMELA
LOPREST, URBAN INST., How FAMILIES THAT LEFT WELFARE ARE DOING: A NATIONAL PICTURE 2 (1999),
available at http://www.urban.orgfUploadedPDF/anf bi.pdf; DEANNA T. SCHEXNAYDER ET AL., CTR. FOR
THE STUDY OF HUMAN RES., THE ROLE OF CHILD SUPPORT IN TEXAS WELFARE DYNAMICS 5 (1998),
available at http://fatherhood.hhs.gov/TX-Dynamics98/execsum.pdf.
199. Even the House/Administration approach, which most heavily and consistently emphasizes
employment, does not apply to "work experience" or "community service" the requirement (to which
education, training, and rehabilitation are subject) that they promote future employability, nor does it
apply any "self-sufficiency" test to the activities required to satisfy the difference between the total
work requirement and the twenty-four hours of core work. See 2005 House Bill, supra note 171; 2002
Administration Proposal, supra note 171. All the Senate Finance bills, which allow a variety of
activities relatively unconnected to employment, nonetheless require that TANF households have in
place a "family self-sufficiency plan" specifying required "work or alternative self-sufficiency
activities," and they would establish participation rate credits linked to the number of recipients who
are employed after they stop receiving TANF benefits. See 2005 Senate Finance Bill, supra note 171,
§§ io9(d), IsO; 2003 Senate Finance Bill, supra note 171, §§ x09(d), I10; 2002 Senate Finance Bill,
supra note 171, §§ 201-202.
200. See, e.g., ROBERT ANSELMI & DEBBIE GREENBERGER, MDRC, MAKING WORK PAY: HOW TO
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT FINANCIAL WORK SUPPORTS TO IMPROVE FAMILY AND CHILD WELL-BEING AND
REDUCE POVERTY (2003), available at http://www.mdrc.org/publications/342/overview.html.
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the goal is to reward work and below which the goal is to relieve poverty.
Most treatments of TANF rely on two distinct categories: those who
are "on" welfare and those who are not, especially those who have "left,"
or "leavers ..... TANF is consistently assessed by reference to the size of
its caseloads, the number "on welfare, .... a number that nationally has
been cut in half since TANF was implemented." This caseload is also the
basis for analyzing how, and in what fashion, welfare recipients are
"working.""
This population of people "on" welfare, however, is only a subset of
the people receiving TANF-funded benefits." This subset is defined by
what the TANF regulations call "assistance, '' 0°  which roughly
corresponds to means-tested cash payments or in-kind benefits of the
sort formerly provided by AFDC." In addition, however, are many
benefits, both cash and in-kind, that are provided through TANF
programs but are deemed "non-assistance" to individuals who are not
counted in the TANF caseload.'9
201. See, e.g., GREGORY Acs & PAMELA LOPREST, URBAN INST., FINAL SYNTHESIS REPORT OF FINDINGS
FROM ASPE'S "LEAVERS" GRANTS (2001), http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=410809.
202. See, e.g., Marc Lacey, The State of the Union: The Overview; Clinton Stakes Claim to U.S.
Prosperity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2000, at AI, which reported that President Clinton's State of the
Union speech summed up his administration's economic accomplishments with the words:
Crime down bv 20 percent. to its lowest level in 21; years. Teen births down seven vears in a
row. adootions up bv -Ao percent. Welfare rolls cut in half to their lowest levels in 30 years.
My fellow Americans, the state of our union is the strongest it has ever been.
See also U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Welfare Caseloads Continue Downward Trend, HHS
NEWS, Nov. 1, 2002, at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/news/press/2oo2/release_IOI0o2.html. (quoting HHS
Secretary Tommy Thompson's comments on a report of continued caseload declines: "This latest
report simply reaffirms that welfare reform in America is working.").
203. Some states have had far more dramatic reductions. See SIXTH ANNUAL TANF REPORT, supra
note 66, at 1-5 tbl.A (listing declines over 70% in Florida, Idaho, Illinois, and Wyoming).
204. See, e.g., COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REP., Io8TH CONG., 2004 GREEN BOOK:
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITrEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS 7-73 to 7-85 (2004) [hereinafter 20o4 GREEN BOOK].
205. See SHAWN FREMSTAD & ZOE NEUBERGER, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, TANF's
"UNCOUNTED" CASES: MORE THAN ONE MILLION WORKING FAMILIES RECEIVING TANF-FUNDED
SERVICES NOT COUNTED IN TANF CASELOAD 1, 3-7, 9 (2002), http://www.cbpp.org/4-24-o2tanf.pdf.
2o6. See 45 C.F.R. § 265.3(b) (2oo6) (describing detailed state reporting requirements for families
receiving "assistance"); see also id. § 261.io(a)(I) (describing individual work requirements applicable
to "a parent or caretaker receiving assistance"); id. § 261.22(b) (describing calculation of state
participation rates based on the "number of families receiving TANF assistance"); id. § 264.1
(describing time limits on providing "assistance"). None of these requirements apply to individuals or
households receiving TANF-funded benefits or services that are not "assistance."
207. See 45 C.F.R. § 26o.31(a)(I) (defining "assistance" as "cash, payments, vouchers, and other
forms of benefits designed to meet a family's ongoing basic needs"). See generally HELPING FAMILIES
ACHIEVE SELF-SUFFICIENCY, supra note 67.
208. See 45 C.F.R. § 26o.31(b). In addition, non-assistance includes certain services to those who
may not be employed but are receiving cash assistance, such as counseling, job placement, and
training, id.; unlike child-care and transportation, these would not ordinarily be part of routine living
expenses.
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For the most part, what renders these benefits "non-assistance" and
thus "not welfare" is the fact that they are delivered to employed
individuals and that they are administratively distinct from traditional
means-tested cash benefits."° Means-tested, TANF-funded child-care
and transportation subsidies are "non-assistance" if the recipient is
employed, but they are "assistance" if the recipient is engaged in
community service or vocational education. ° Similarly, it is "non-
assistance" when one receives wages from a subsidized employer who in
turn is reimbursed ioo% from TANF funds, but it is "assistance" if the
same work is done in a "work experience" position and the same
payment is received in the form of a welfare check."'
Because these "non-assistance" benefits require that the recipient be
employed, they are functionally equivalent to benefits subject to a work
requirement in which only employment counts as work. This is not
merely a formalistic question of the label applied to the benefits.2
Recipients of "non-assistance" benefits are not subject to TANF time
limits, work requirements,"' or other conditions such as child-support
cooperation and assignment." 4 Moreover, many benefits are available
209. Cf. Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Or Welfare? The Administration Of The Earned Income Tax
Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 19oo-o6 (2005) (discussing the significance of the EITC's location
within the tax code).
210. Cf. Garrett v. Lyng, 877 F.2d 472, 473-76 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding treatment of workfare
under Food Stamps regulation, which reversed prior regulation treating as earned income public
assistance conditioned on work); 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(b)(2)(i) (excluding from "earned income" for Food
Stamps purposes "[a]ssistance payments from programs which require, as a condition of eligibility, the
actual performance of work without compensation"). Compare 45 C.F.R. § 26o.3I(b)(3), with id.
§ 260.31 (a)(3).
211. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 260.3I(b)(2), with id. § 260.31(a)(2). See generally CLIFFORD M. JOHNSON
& STEVE SAVNER, CTR. FOR LAW & Soc. POLICY & CTR. FOR BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, FEDERAL
FUNDING SOURCES FOR PUBLIC JOB CREATION INITIATIVES (999),
http://www.clasp.org/publications/federalfundingsources.pdf. Similarly, a TANF-funded refundable
state Earned Income Credit is not deemed to be "welfare," even though the same payment based on
the same income threshold is "assistance" if it is delivered through the state "welfare" system. See 45
C.F.R. § 26o.3I(b)(4); NICHOLAS JOHNSON, CTR. FOR BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, A HAND UP: How
STATE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDITS HELP WORKING FAMILIES ESCAPE POVERTY IN 2001, at 29-31
(2001), http://www.cbpp.org/io-i8-oisfp.htm. The equivalent payment through the welfare system
could be achieved through the use of what are known as "earned income disregards," which prevent
benefits from being reduced when income rises from earnings. See generally Marie Cohen,
Welfare Information Network, Earned Income Disregards, ISSUE NOTES, Apr. 1997,
http://www.financeproject.org/Publications/income.htm; RowE & VERSTEEG, supra note 76, at 28-29.
212. See generally David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 961-64 (2004) (discussing interchangeability of tax and spending
programs).
213. This matters because even though employed recipients of non-assistance benefits are
obviously "working," they would not satisfy TANF work requirements if a part-time work schedule
brought them below the minimum required weekly hours of work.
214. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6o4 (i) (authorizing states to sanction adult recipients of "assistance" who
fail to ensure that their minor children attend school); id. § 6o8(a)(2), (3) (requiring that states
penalize recipients of "assistance" who do not cooperate in establishing paternity and child support
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only in non-assistance form because they have maximum income
thresholds much higher than those for TANF assistance."5 Thus, a child-
care subsidy may be available to a full-time employee with a household
income of $15,000 but not to a full-time college student with the same
household income." 6 Non-assistance benefits also are quite significant in
sheer magnitude, accounting for roughly half the expenditures on TANF
programs and between a third and a half of all households receiving
TANF-funded benefits.
Taking a larger view, then, TANF actually has created a two-tiered
structure of work requirements. The bottom tier includes those receiving
traditional welfare "assistance" subject to work requirements that
emphasize employment but that also include substantial unpaid activities
as "work." The top tier includes those receiving means-tested benefits
conditioned on employment alone, but which carry neither the "welfare"
label nor the various consequences that come with that label. This two-
tiered system within TANF is a microcosm of the broader relationship
between TANF and the EITC, the site of the other major recent change
in work-based anti-poverty policy and to which I now turn. i 8
orders or who do not assign to the state rights to child support); SIXTH ANNUAL TANF REPORT, supra
note 66, at XII-28-3I (compiling state "family cap" or "child exclusion" policies that decrease welfare
payments when one or more children within the household was born or conceived while the adult was
receiving welfare).
215. The income ceiling for non-assistance programs often is 200% of the federal poverty line, or
about $32,000 per year for a family of three in 2005. See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty
Guidelines, 7o Fed. Reg. 8373, 8374 (Feb. 18, 2005).
216. The college student, might, however, be eligible for a child-care subsidy funded by the Child
Care and Development Fund, which permits subsidies to parents in jobs or training, but not
community service. See 42 U.S.C. § 9858n(4)(c) (2000).
217. Precise data is not available because states are not required to compile and report data on
non-assistance recipients as they are on assistance, see 45 C.F.R. § 265.3(b), but a 2002 Government
Accounting Office survey found over 8oo,ooo non-assistance recipients in twenty-five states using a
method that likely resulted in a substantial undercount. See CYNTHIA M. FAGNONI, U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE REFORM: STATES PROVIDE TANF-FUNDED SERVICES TO MANY Low-
INCOME FAMILIES WHO Do NOT RECEIVE CASH ASSISTANCE 9-11, GAO-o2-615T (2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do26s5t.pdf; FREMSTAD & NEUBERGER, supra note 205, at 5-7 (discussing
methodological issues in counting non-assistance recipients). Nationally, there are about two million
households receiving "assistance." See SIXTH ANNUAL TANF REPORT, supra note 66, at I-5 (tbl.A); see
also Office of Family Assistance, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Caseload Data Index (2006),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov//programs/ofa/caseload/caseloadindex.htm [hereinafter HHS Caseload Data].
In the two states where complete data were available, there were more recipients of "non-assistance"
than "assistance." See FAGNONI, supra, at 11-12. Between federal TANF and state matching funds,
about $11.6 billion was spent on non-assistance work supports in 2002, compared to about $10.4 billion
on cash assistance. See SIXTH ANNUAL TANF REPORT, supra note 66, at 11-1- 5 . This figures excludes
administrative expenses, but it includes non-assistance spent on services to recipients of assistance.
218. It also reflects the increasing difficulty of distinguishing cleanly between "welfare" policy
oriented toward alleviating the burdens of poverty and "employment" policy oriented toward
structuring labor markets. See, e.g., HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 6, at s1, 15; Alstott, supra note
22, at 569; SHARON DIETRICH ET AL., NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, WELFARE REFORMING THE
WORKPLACE: PROTECTING THE EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS OF WELFARE RECIPIENTS, IMMIGRANTS, AND
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II. WORK IN THE EITC
The Earned Income Tax Credit is legally and administratively
distinct from TANF, but its history, structure, and purpose always have
been intertwined tightly with the relationship between work and
welfare.219 Its basic purposes-rewarding and thereby encouraging work,
and relieving poverty for families containing a working adult"°-echo
those typically attributed to TANF, and President Clinton consistently
linked EITC expansion and welfare reform.22' Commentators across the
political spectrum have continued this pattern, often treating the EITC as
a model for a "work support" approach to anti-poverty policy, one in
which work is demanded as a condition of relief while also being
affirmatively supported so as to make work possible.222 As a practical
matter, the EITC now dwarfs TANF as a program transferring resources
to low-income Americans, both as a matter of costs-about $30 billion
versus $12 billion in 200323-and households served-about 19 million
versus 2 million in 2003.4 For all these reasons, any discussion of welfare
work requirements must incorporate the EITC into the analysis.2
Nonetheless, the easy continuity between these two elements of
work-based antipoverty policy becomes far more complicated once one
focuses on how the programs define work. The EITC's work-based
benefits are available exclusively to people in paid activities. Thus,
individuals in unpaid activities may be "working" for TANF purposes
DISPLACED WORKERS (I997). This merger of public policies itself mirrors the actual experience of low-
income people, who even before the welfare reform of the mid-io9os moved regularly between
welfare receipt, low-wage employment, and combinations of the two. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note io,
at 6, 220.
219. See V. Joseph Hotz & John Karl Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit, in MEANS-TESTED
TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 141, 143-45 (Robert A. Moffitt ed., 2oo3) (describing
history of the EITC and its origins in the early i97os debates over alternatives to AFDC); Dennis J.
Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political History of the Earned Income Tax
Credit, 1969-99, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 983 (2000).
220. A typical formulation from President Clinton's first State of the Union address characterizes
the program as one that "reward[s] the work of millions of working poor Americans by realizing the
principle that if you work forty hours a week and you've got a child in the house, you will no longer be
in poverty." Hotz & Scholz, supra note 219, at 146.
221. Alstott, supra note 22, at 539.
222. See Isabel Sawhill & Ron Haskins, Welfare Reform and the Work Support System, in WELFARE
REFORM AND BEYOND: THE FUTURE OF THE SAFETY NET IO7 (Isabel V. Sawhill et al., eds. 2002).
223. See 2004 GREEN BOOK, supra note 204, at 13-41. (EITC figure based on refunded credit, with
an additional $4 billion in unrefunded credits that offset tax liability); Administration for Children &
Families, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Fiscal Year 20o3 TANF Financial Data tbl.F,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofs/data/tanL2003.html (TANF figure based on combined state and
federal expenditures on cash assistance, with total combined expenditures equalling $26 billion).
224. See 2004 GREEN BOOK, supra note 204, at 13-4I; HHS Caseload Data, supra note 217. The
number of EITC recipient households dwarfs TANF even when limited to those with incomes below
$io,ooo annually (5.6 million households) or $20,0o0 annually (I I million).
225. For more general treatments of the EITC, see Alstott, supra note 22 and Hotz & Scholz,
supra note 219.
June 2006]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
but ineligible for the EITC's "work support."2' 6 Seeing this little-noticed
fact raises important questions about the role of work in these two
programs, about whether it really is or should be the same. Answering
these questions requires confronting a deep tension between paying
benefits based on the extent of work (tending to increase benefits as
employment increases) and paying them based on lack of income
(tending to decrease benefits as employment increases). 27
A. How THE EITC IDENTIFIES WORK
Although the EITC is a program universally understood to address
work and poverty 8 the term "work" does not appear in its authorizing
statute. Instead, the EITC responds to work by conditioning eligibility on
the presence of "earned income. ' 29 This is a subset of taxable income,
defined specifically for EITC purposes as earnings from wages and
salaries, or from self-employment income.
In marked contrast to TANF's definition of allowable work
activities, the EITC's earnings-based approach to work is both simple
and uncontroversial. Disputes over the EITC have focused on its cost,
administration, and redistributive character. 3 ° No one, however, has
questioned whether non-earners could "play by the rules" by getting
training or performing community service and thereby claim the mantle
of the "working poor" that triggers relief through the EITC.23 '
226. The reverse can also be true. EITC eligibility does not require any particular number of hours
of work, so a low-wage worker with a twenty-five hour per week schedule could qualify for the
maximum EITC benefit but be disqualified from TANF. See Lawrence M. Mead, Rebuilding Welfare
into a Work-Based System, POVERTY RESEARCH NEWS, Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 9, available at
http://www.jcpr.org/newsletters/vol5_no6/vol56.pdf (criticizing this aspect of the EITC). More
generally, a variety of non-work-related restrictions preclude TANF but not EITC eligibility, including
those relating to immigration status and household structure. See supra note 214. Finally, EITC
receipt, unlike TANF, has no time limit.
227. See Alstott, supra note 22, at 557-58.
228. See id. at 539-40; Hotz & Scholz, supra note 219, at 146.
229. See I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(A) (2oo6).
230. See Ventry, supra note 219, at 999.
231. But cf. Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1618-i9, I636-4 o (1996)
(suggesting a nonrefundable credit analogous to the EITC and designed solely to offset the increased
tax liability of cash-strapped low-income households that would result from her proposed taxation of
imputed income from unpaid housework). As a matter of historical explanation, this likely has much
to do with the EITC's position within the tax code and its historical association with offsetting payroll
taxes on earnings. See generally Ventry, supra note 219. Nonetheless, because the EITC has its own
definition of earned income, including refinements noted below, rather than simply relying on
preexisting tax categories, it cannot be said that its approach to work simply follows from the choice to
administer the program through the tax code. Indeed, if one thought the current "earned income"
definition failed to capture the relevant universe of work, it would be possible to modify the EITC
within the tax code to respond to non-income-generating forms of work, just as special information for
EITC purposes already is collected with regard to the number, age, and residency of "qualifying
children." See Schedule EIC, Earned Income Credit Qualifying Child Information, OMB No. 1545-
0074 (2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/flo4osei.pdf; see also Weisbach & Nussim,
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At most, the EITC's approach to work can occasionally raise subtle
questions about which payments are earnings when they are triggered by
an activity other than conventional employment. 3 Most notably for
present purposes, the statute explicitly excludes from "earned income"
payments made to TANF recipients on condition that they perform
"work experience" or "community service." '33 Thus, these activities do
not receive EITC work support even though they are work for TANF
purposes, and even though workfare programs are treated as
employment for some labor law purposes.2 3
4
More generally, the EITC's and TANF's work-related eligibility
requirements will yield opposite results for any unpaid activity235 that
TANF treats as work.236 Someone "working" in paid employment will be
eligible for the EITC while someone with the same income (from non-
employment sources) "working" in education or community service will
not.
B. THE EITC AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORK AND NEED
The distinction between the EITC's employment-based eligibility
and TANF's broader approach to work mirrors the distinction made
within TANF between employment-conditioned non-assistance benefits
and the more prominent assistance conditioned on specified work
activities. As with the non-assistance/assistance divide, the EITC/TANF
differences in work would be of limited consequence if they simply
resulted in functionally equivalent benefits arriving with different labels
attached.
Thus, one might imagine that shifts between unpaid community
supra note 212 (discussing how any program currently configured as a spending program could be
reconfigured for administration through the tax code with the same substantive requirements); cf.
James Tobin et al., Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77 YALE L.J. I, 11-14 (1967) (arguing that the
tax code's definition of "income" should vary between calculation of negative and positive income
taxes).
232. See Kirk J. Stark, Should California Adopt an Earned Income Tax Credit?, CAL POL'Y OrrIONS
2006 93, 103-05.
233. I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(B)(v); I.R.S. Notice 99-3, 1999-I C.B. 271; Stark, supra note 232, at io3-o4.
234. See United States v. City of New York, 359 F.3d 83, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2004). Payments made to
inmates engaged in prison labor are also excluded. I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(B)(iv).
235. As the workfare example illustrates, such TANF recipients are both getting paid and engaging
in a work activity, so the real question is whether that pay is attributed to the specific work activity as
"earned" or instead is attributed to a general state of need for which the state is providing assistance.
EITC aside, unearned assistance generally is not taxed even though in an economic sense it obviously
is income. See Stark, supra note 232, at 103-04.
236. Additionally, for the EITC the complete absence of earnings is automatically disqualifying,
whereas TANF programs allow exemptions for those who fail to work for good cause, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 6o7(e)(i) (2006) (mandating sanctions for noncompliance with TANF work requirements "subject to
such good cause and other exceptions as the State may establish"). Even when no good cause exists,
some states reduce but do not eliminate benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 6o7(e)(i) (permitting either a pro
rata reduction in benefits or benefit termination); ROWE & VERSTEEG, supra note 76, at 100-03.
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service and paid employment would simply mean switching between
TANF and the EITC. Were that so, the two programs would be
functionally equivalent to a single program that permitted qualification
as work under either program's definition. The two programs routinely
are portrayed in roughly this fashion, two components of an integrated
policy that delivers poverty relief while encouraging work through the
combined operation of TANF's "stick" of work requirements and
EITC's "carrot" of work incentives.
In some ways, shifts from unpaid to paid activities do simply result in
transitions between the two programs, but in others ways they do not. In
particular, from the perspective of poverty relief, the EITC
systematically favors paid work, in the sense that as between two
"workers" with equal incomes, the EITC supplements the income of the
paid but not the unpaid worker. To see how this happens, some
additional comparative detail about the EITC and TANF is necessary
first.
Analysts typically divide the EITC into three stages associated with
progressively higher earned incomes: phase-in, plateau, and phase-out.237
During the phase-in period the value of the credit begins at $o for
households with zero earnings and, for a household with two children,
the credit then increases at a rate of $40 for every additional $ioo in
earnings, up to the maximum benefit of $4204. At earnings between
$1o,51o and $13,730, the amount of the credit plateaus at $4204. Above
$13,730 in income, the credit phases out at a rate of $21 for every $ioo in
additional income, until it reaches zero at $33,692 in income.23
Now compare TANF assistance. Although state programs differ in
important respects, they are more similar to one another than to the
EITC, and they share a consistent general structure. Thus, it is possible
to identify broad similarities and differences between TANF and the
EITC.
One point of TANF-EITC similarity is in benefit levels. The EITC's
roughly $4200 annual maximum benefit falls in the middle range of
equivalent TANF benefits, which vary by state but are roughly $4500 at
the median.23 9 The fundamental difference comes in how eligibility for
this benefit relates to household income. TANF programs always pay
237. See Alstott, supra note 22, at 541, 548-49; Hotz & Scholz, supra note 219, at 145-50.
238. 2004 GREEN BOOK, supra note 204, at 13-36-13-39. Each of these variables is affected by the
number of children and whether it is a joint return. See id. Reductions in benefits during the phase-out
period are determined by the greater of earnings or adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 32(a)(2)(B).
Even during the phase-out period, however, adjusted gross income affects only the amount by which
the credit is reduced; the base amount of the credit continues to be determined exclusively by earned
income. Id. § 32(a).
239. See SIXTH ANNUAL TANF REPORT, supra note 66, at XII- 4 -5. Seven states pay annual benefits
below $3000, and seven pay above $700o. Id.
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their maximum cash benefit to households with zero outside income,
whereas the EITC pays these households nothing at all. As income rises,
TANF benefits drop24 while EITC benefits increase (if the income is
earned). In other words, TANF lacks any phase-in period; it begins at the
maximum benefit and then phases out.24 This feature of TANF is
compatible with its work requirements only because work is not limited
to employment; if it were so limited, then the same condition that
maximized benefit size (zero income) would also eliminate benefit
eligibility (no work). 4
Maximizing benefits at zero income reflects the standard conception
of anti-poverty programs as closing a gap between a level of resources a
household needs-in welfare administration terminology the "standard
of need"243-and the level of resources ("means") actually available to
meet those needs. Hence, one is eligible for transfers if needs exceed
means, and the difference determines the magnitude of the transfer.2"
Strict application of this need-minus-resources approach would lead
to dollar-for-dollar reductions in benefits as income rises. To mitigate the
resulting earnings disincentive,245 TANF programs typically employ a
"benefit reduction rate" (BRR) below ioo%, so that for each new dollar
earned, benefits are reduced by less than one dollar4 6 Thus, the entire
benefit structure of most TANF programs looks roughly like the phase-
out period of the EITC: benefits drop as income increases, but at a
slower rate.247 The difference is that TANF begins to phase out more or
240. Typically, benefits drop by $1 for each new dollar of unearned outside income, and at a lower
rate, though usually at least 50%, for earned income. See ROWE & VERSTEEG, supra note 76, at 69-7o,
74-75. Also, when income is earned, most programs have a modest plateau (that is, a period of o%
reduction) before benefits begin to drop. See id. at 74-75. Many programs similarly disregard a small
amount (usually $5o per month) of child support payments. See id. at II8-I9.
241. See Alstott, supra note 22, at 540-41; Hotz & Scholz, supra note 219, at 141-42.
242. For this reason, the EITC phase-in period also can be recharacterized as the combination of
two components: a traditional means-tested benefit with a maximum benefit level at zero income and
a separate financial penalty for non-work that reduces the benefit amount. This penalty starts at ioo%
at zero earnings (thus eliminating the entire benefit) and then phases out as work increases (measured
by earnings magnitude). If, as earnings rise, the decrease in the penalty for non-work is larger than the
decrease in benefits due to means-testing, then the net value of the benefit will rise, duplicating the
EITC's phase-in period.
243. See STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 104TH CONG., 1996 GREEN BOOK:
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS 384, 390,411,454 (1996).
244. See generally PANEL ON POVERTY AND FAMILY ASSISTANCE, NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, MEASURING
POVERTY: A NEW APPROACH 317-81 (Constance F. Citro & Robert T. Michael eds., 1995); Alstott,
supra note 22, at 540-41.
245. See Robert Moffitt, The Negative Income Tax and the Evolution of U.S. Welfare Policy, 17 J.
ECON. PERSPS. I19, 119 (2003).
246. See Robert Moffitt, Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review, 30 J. ECON. LIT. I,
8, 15 (1992).
247. In its phase-out stage, the EITC applies the same BRR to earned and other taxable income,
see 32 U.S.C. § 32(a)(2)(B) (2oo6); TANF programs, in contrast, typically reduce benefits more
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less immediately, but the EITC does not begin to phase out until almost
$14,000 in income. Indeed, by the roughly $io,ooo earnings level at which
EITC benefits first reach their peak value, TANF benefits have almost
always diminished to zero or become relatively insignificant.4" In other
words, over the same $o-io,ooo range in which the EITC starts at zero
and phases in to its maximum, TANF starts at its maximum and phases
out to zero.
Now we can return to the significance of the two programs' different
definitions of work. Consider a TANF recipient who is satisfying work
requirements in a full-time unpaid activity like community service or job
training. She is eligible for TANF's maximum benefit and ineligible for
any EITC. What happens if she substitutes full-time low-wage
employment? Her earnings now jump to $io,ooo-plus, her TANF benefit
drops to near zero, and her EITC benefit jumps to over $4000. From one
perspective, this is just the sort of inconsequential swap that makes the
different work definitions look complementary: moving from TANF
work to EITC work just means moving between TANF benefits and
EITC benefits of comparable sizes. Indeed, in one sense this permits
different forms of work to be treated equally by not penalizing paid work
(which necessarily increases income) with benefit reductions from which
unpaid work is immune. Counteracting this work (meaning employment)
disincentive of means-tested welfare is a standard argument for the
EITC. 249
Seeing the TANF/EITC relationship in this way, however, places the
emphasis on treating these programs as "work supports" (paying people
to reward or encourage their work). It provides little account of their
anti-poverty function because it is unresponsive to differences in total
income. If $4000 total income is sufficient to meet someone's household
needs while doing unpaid work, then it looks like quite a windfall when
she gets a job that pays $io,ooo but still receives a $4000 anti-poverty
transfer.25 ° Or, if an additional $4000 is needed to meet the household
quickly when unearned, rather than earned, income increases, see ROWE & VERSTEEG, supra note 76, at
69-75.
248. In thirty-four states, an unmarried TANF recipient employed full-time at the minimum wage
with two children loses all TANF benefits, and in another seven the available benefits are less than
$iooo annually. See 2004 GREEN BOOK, supra note 204, at 7-49-50 tbl.7-I5. In some States that do
provide TANF benefits at these income levels, those benefits are restricted to current recipients
because new applicants are ineligible for reduced BRRs. Compare RowE & VERSTEEG, supra note 76,
at 64-65 tbl.I.E.4 (maximum income for initial eligibility), with id. at 126-27 tbl.IV.A.5 (maximum
income for ongoing eligibility).
249. The employment incentives created by the EITC are actually quite complex, both because
they shift in character over its different periods and because tracing their effects on an individual
whose earnings begin at zero and then increase over time fails to account for the effects on individuals
who, without the EITC, already have earnings within or just above the transfer eligibility range. See
Alstott, supra note 22; Hotz & Scholz, supra note 225.
25o. For this reason, conservatives have often opposed constructing work incentives with "carrots"
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needs of a low-wage worker already earning $io,ooo, then it looks like an
abandonment to hardship when an unpaid worker with $io,ooo less
income receives no compensating increase in the anti-poverty transfer. 5 ,
If the theory is one of parity between TANF-defined and EITC-
defined work, and the purpose of the transfers is to fight worker poverty,
then leaving the unpaid "worker" up to $io,ooo deeper in poverty than
the paid worker looks like a dramatic difference in treatment between
forms of work. It is no answer at this point to say simply that the EITC
aims to relieve poverty only for those who demonstrate their desert
through work. The same can be said for TANF. The scenario at issue is
one in which the recipient, rather than "doing nothing," is "doing
something" that TANF accepts as work-for instance, training or
community service-but that the EITC does not because it is unpaid. If
both workers are equally deserving, then it is hard to see-from an anti-
poverty perspective-why one would be left at $4000 total income while
transfers would be devoted to raising the other up to $14,000 total
income."'
The same point can be put another way by comparing directly two
workers with the same pre-transfer income. One earns $io,ooo at a low-
wage job. The other is a full-time student or a volunteer who receives
$io,ooo in some combination of child support, alimony, survivor's
benefits, or payments on behalf of a child.253 The low-paid employee is
(like gradual phase-outs of benefits as earnings increase) rather than "sticks" (reductions in benefits
for non-work). See Blank, supra note 154, at 1110 (discussing Reagan-era reductions in AFDC earned
income disregards); see also GORDON L. BERLIN, MDRC, ENCOURAGIN WORK, REDUCING POVERTY:
THE IMPACr OF WORK INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 20 & n.9 (2OOO).
251. I have greatly simplified this analysis in a number of respects that do not affect the ultimate
point. Increased child-care costs may be associated with employment, but the EITC is available even if
(as is often the case) there are no such costs; when there are, additional programs, including TANF
non-assistance, may cover them. I also have not taken account of payroll taxes, which reduce the net
pay of low-wage workers but which are dwarfed by the EITC in the plateau stage for workers with
children; not until well into the phase-out stage do payroll taxes exceed the EITC. Moreover, the
common notion that payroll taxes unfairly burden low-income workers implicitly relies on the idea
that someone with a $io,ooo income is poor and therefore cannot afford to pay the same taxes as other
earners.
252. My discussion of the EITC focuses on its phase-in and plateau stages. These stages are where
the EITC delivers its primary work-promotion and poverty-reduction effects and where it interacts
most strongly with welfare policy. Nonetheless, a full treatment of the EITC must take account of its
extended phase-out stage, where a majority of recipients lie. See Adam Carasso & C. Eugene Steuerle,
Tax Policy Center, Projected Distribution of EITC Claims in 2003, TAX NOTES, July 19, 2004, at 301,
available at http://www.urban.orgUploadedPDF/iooo669-_TaxFacts-o719o4.pdf. The phase-out stage's
inclusion of large numbers of relatively small beneficiaries can be understood as simply a by-product
of the tradeoff between targeting poorer workers and avoiding disincentives for those workers to
increase their earnings. See Alstott, supra note 22, at 55I. But see Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage,
the Earned Income Credit and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 408-09 (997)
(criticizing analyses of the EITC phase-out stage for treating EITC reductions separately from taxes
on income).
253. This is a perfectly realistic scenario. According to the Census Bureau's 2004 American
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considered both deserving and poor, and so she receives roughly $4000
from the EITC; moreover, her income is thousands of dollars below
where the EITC begins phasing out. The equally poor student or
volunteer, however, receives no poverty relief from the EITC because
her income is unearned. Although she could satisfy TANF's work
requirements, almost all state TANF programs will consider her
insufficiently needy to receive welfare.25 4 She receives no transfer and is
left to make do with $io,ooo.
Again, this inconsistency cannot simply be dismissed as the
byproduct of restricting transfers to workers. True, one could decide that
the appropriate definition of work for EITC purposes is paid
employment; this would justify treating the student or volunteer like the
person "doing nothing" and thus undeserving of transfers even if
genuinely poor. The problem, though, is that TANF adopts a different
definition of work. The question, then, is why an activity should qualify
as work for one means-tested transfer (TANF) but not for another
(EITC).
Ultimately, there simply is no way to treat paid and unpaid work the
same both with regard to transfer size and with regard to the net income
post-transfer. This is because earnings are relevant in two different ways:
as a characteristic of work and as a component of income. 55 Either
transfers decrease as earnings rise (in which case paid workers receive
smaller transfers than unpaid workers) or they do not (in which case
transfer programs leave paid workers better off than unpaid workers).
These tensions could be relieved somewhat by introducing a
hierarchy of work: employment is first-class work and unpaid activities
are at best second-class work.5 Either type of worker is protected
against utter destitution (by TANF), but only first-class workers are
protected against ordinary poverty (by the EITC). Indeed, this seems
like a fair description of our current system, but it demands a more
complex account of what, on the one hand, distinguishes both forms of
work from non-work and, on the other, what differentiates first- from
Community Survey, among households headed by an unmarried parent with at least two children and
with total income between $5ooo and $io,ooo, roughly one-third got their income entirely from
unearned sources such as those listed above, roughly one-third got their income entirely from
earnings, and the remainder combined the two in varying degrees. See Tabulation Provided to Author
by the UCLA School of Law Empirical Research Group (Mar. 23, 2006) (on file with author).
254. See ROWE & VERSTEEG, supra note 76, at 78-79. In the few remaining states, benefits would be
very low.
255. This analysis relies on using cash as the measure of income for means-testing purposes. It is
possible to loosen this double-bind by incorporating into poverty measurement both the costs of child-
care and the non-cash "imputed income" generated by non-market care. See Zatz, supra note 13.
256. For an exploration of a similar idea specifically with regard to workfare, see Diller, supra note
9, at 27-28.
[Vol. 57:113I1
WELFARE TO WHAT?
second-class work. 57
The obvious basis for favoring paid over unpaid work, even if the
latter is favored over "doing nothing," is that paid work makes a greater
immediate contribution to self-sufficiency. But this rationale provides a
particularly awkward account of the transition between TANF and the
EITC. The same level of earnings that minimizes TANF benefits (in
roughly the $IO,000-$13,ooo range) also maximizes EITC benefits. Thus,
shifting from unpaid activities to employment does not necessarily
promote self-sufficiency in the sense of reducing transfers.2 8 Indeed, one
could say that unpaid activities actually minimize EITC benefits, though
they also maximize TANF benefits.
This point not only affects the shifting in work definitions between
TANF and the EITC, but also further illuminates how TANF itself
defines work. Viewing TANF in isolation, an emphasis on employment,
either in the short- or long-term, appears to offer a tight fit with a self-
sufficiency rationale for work requirements: an increase in employment
income (the consequence of fulfilling work requirements) leads to a
decrease in transfer levels (because a means-tested transfer falls in value
as income rises). Once TANF and the EITC are viewed as two parts of
one larger system of work-conditioned transfers, however, this analysis
begins to break down because decreasing TANF transfers are coupled
with increasing EITC transfers.
The foregoing points show that a full understanding of how work is
defined, and of the consequences of particular definitions, requires
understanding how those particular definitions interact with other
aspects of program design. This is particularly true in the context of
welfare work requirements where earnings are relevant to transfer
eligibility through both the mechanism of means-testing and the
mechanism of work requirements.
CONCLUSION
Both the equation of work with paid employment and the
integration of work requirements into anti-poverty programs strike many
as just common sense. I have shown how complicated, and contested,
work becomes once one pays attention to how real-world programs go
about sorting transfer recipients into workers and non-workers. State
legislatures and administrators -hardly where one would look first for
radical ideas or theoretical flights of fancy-in fact are defining work in
257. Defenses of linking work and redistribution often posit work as an institutional locus of
universal citizenship and social inclusion, see generally Linda Bosniak, Citizenship and Work, 27 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 497 (2OO2), but the appeal of such a conception may diminish considerably if
second-class workers get only second-class citizenship.
258. In a forthcoming paper, I develop this point in greater depth and address whether a longer-
term perspective requires that it be qualified. See Zatz, supra note 13.
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ways that confound an easy conflation of work and employment.
All of the activities states have allowed as work are consistent with
at least one plausible rationale for work requirements, but some
activities seem doubtful under other rationales. The creativity within and
inconsistency between state work policies reflect the diversity latent
within and the contradictions between distinct theoretical accounts of
work.
These observations recommend great caution as new federal
regulations are drafted to clarify TANF's work activity definitions. The
temptation will be great to impose some consistent approach or set of
criteria to guide these definitions. Although this might be desirable in the
design of welfare policy in the first instance, in this case it could not help
but distort the elusive character of work that has bedeviled so many
would-be rationalizers and that Congress wrote into TANF itself.
This cautionary note is particularly apt because of the way that
defining work interacts with other dimensions of welfare policy design,
most of which TANF clearly entrusts to individual states' discretion. I
offer the following concrete example by way of illustration.
Everyone agrees that there are circumstances in which the goal of
self-sufficiency through work would be better served by spending time in
an unpaid activity that enhanced future employability than by spending
time in a fruitless job search. There is, however, serious disagreement
about what those circumstances are and about the nature of appropriate
unpaid activities. Two obviously relevant considerations are the amount
of time the activity will require and the nature of the employment that
could be obtained if the activity succeeds. Not even the most vigorous
proponents of education propose sending a welfare recipient with a high
school degree to four years of college and four more years of medical
school just because she cannot currently find full-time work at $io per
hour.
But now consider an actual case closer to the line. In Kosmicki v.
Nebraska, the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected a welfare recipient's
claim that she should be allowed to satisfy her work requirement by
completing a four-year college degree toward which she already had
significant credits. 59 The court reasoned that the primary purpose of
work requirements was to promote "self-sufficiency" and that whether a
given activity advanced this purpose had to be analyzed against the
backdrop of Nebraska's two-year time limit on TANF assistance.
Nebraska's work requirements aimed for self-sufficiency by the end of a
stint on welfare, the court held. Therefore, the proposed course of study
was impermissible because the recipient could not complete it before her
259. See 652 N.W.2d 883, 896 (Neb. 2002).
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benefits terminated due to the time limit.2'6
The significance of the Kosmicki court's reasoning lies in the
interaction between the definition of work and the seemingly distinct
matter of the time limit. If Nebraska's time limit had been substantially
longer, as permitted by federal law, then application of the same abstract
criteria for work would have yielded a different result because the degree
could have been completed before time ran out. The same activity-
completing a college degree-could be classified as "work," or not,
depending on other policy variables.
A similar dynamic can arise from the amount rather than the
duration of benefits. Whether available employment enables "self-
sufficiency" in the sense of leaving welfare depends not only on the wage
paid but also on the income level at which benefits drop to zero. In many
states, annual earnings under $8ooo are enough to "earn out" of TANF,
but, in many others, workers making over $12,ooo remain eligible for
transfers 6 , In the latter states, a self-sufficiency standard might permit a
sequence of unpaid activities designed eventually to enable annual
earnings above $12,000, which reuires placement in a job paying well
over the federal minimum wage. 2 In the former states, however, such
activities might be less appropriate, even if they share the same abstract
self-sufficiency goals for work.
Thus, we should resist the temptation to see starkly different
approaches to work as evidence that one or another program, in one or
another state, is betraying the public policy underlying work
requirements. During the TANF reauthorization debate, conservative
advocates of a stronger emphasis on employment and workfare lodged
just this accusation at approaches that embrace a broader conception of
work; they claimed that this breadth undermines the fundamental drive
toward employment and the obligation to give back to the community.263
And liberal advocates of training, rehabilitation, and perhaps even
treating some caregiving as work, returned fire in kind, criticizing "work
first" strategies for elevating caseload reduction through employment
260. Id. at 89o-92.
261. ROWE & VERSTEEG, supra note 76, at 126-27.
262. Using the standard thresholds for full-time, full-year employment of thirty five hours per
week and fifty weeks per year, earning $12,ooo requires and hourly wage of $6.86. See U.S. Census
Bureau, Current Population Survey (CPS) Definitions and Explanations (2004),
http://www.census.gov/population/www/cps/cpsdef.html (defining "work experience").
263. See 149 CONO. REC. H465, 526 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2003) (statement of Rep. Souder) (criticizing
proposals to expand availability of education under TANF as "a masquerade to go back to the days of
old when you could stay in school forever"); Haskins & Blank, supra note 3, at 26 (characterizing
education and training as "diluting the work requirement"); BRIAN M. RIEDL & ROBERT E. RECTOR,
HERITAGE FOUND., BACKGROUNDER #1568, MYTHS AND FACTS: WHY SUCCESSFUL WELFARE REFORM
MUST STRENGTHEN WORK REQUIREMENTS (2002), http://www.heritage.org/Research/Welfare/
BGt568.cfm.
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over important goals of poverty reduction, personal growth, and family
well-being.S4
My contention is that the competing approaches to defining work
reflect the incoherence of the "consensus" in favor of work
requirements, not a subversion of that consensus. I develop this
argument more systematically in a companion paper that traces out the
different ways in which a policy of welfare work requirements would
define work, depending on the underlying theory justifying those
requirements.
65
The potential for conflict between these approaches to work is,
however, already visible in the different directions that work has gone
under TANF and the EITC. The TANF statute itself reflects this
fractured character. In one moment it emphasizes working toward a goal
of unsubsidized employment but in another it embraces as work both
"community service" and unpaid care for others' children. Looking at
TANF and the EITC as a unit only deepens these tensions.
For policymakers and commentators considering how an individual
state should design its welfare work policy, this incoherence ought to be
both frustrating and liberating. Coming up with a principled policy
requires sorting through some difficult normative questions, and
resolving some deep tensions, that have yet to be analyzed in any detail.
And yet the very fact that TANF itself failed to resolve those questions
provides substantial latitude, latitude that a number of states have
utilized with great creativity. Any particular design of welfare work
requirements can be criticized for failing to implement fully one or more
important policies underlying TANF. The same is true for any future
federal redesign of TANF, or of work-based transfer programs more
generally. Such criticism, however, cannot be avoided, and so the real
question is only in which way should the contradictions of work be
embraced.
Despite its familiarity, work is rich in complexities, and in surprises.
We have much to learn from how legislators and administrators have
sorted through these complexities as they translate abstract
endorsements of work into concrete rules that can decide individual
cases. In order to make use of those lessons to design better policies, we
have much more work to do.
264. Strawn et al., supra note t88, at 235-36; Peter Edelman, Editorial, The True Purpose of
Welfare Reform, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2002, at A2i; Kelley O'Dell, Child Well-Being and the
Reauthorization of Welfare Reform, REAUTHORIZATION NoTEs, Feb. 2002,
http://www.financeproject.org/Publications/childwellbeing-trn.htm.
265. Zatz, supra note 13.
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